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INTRODUCTION
A career of thirty years on the federal bench is difficult to
condense. For this article, Judge Bright was asked to select
those few cases that, in his opinion, best represent his juris-
prudential principles-those cases of which he is most proud.
Although one of his selections, Reserve Mining Co. v. United
States,' is treated elsewhere in this issue by Professor Farber,
the remainder of his choices fall neatly into three primary
categories: Criminal Law, Evidence, and Employment Anti-
Discrimination Law. We treat these areas in sequence. Each
subsection is then devoted to an individual case and includes a
synopsis of the facts and a discussion of Judge Bright's opinion
or dissent, as appropriate. The law clerks that worked with
Judge Bright augment the summaries with their own recollec-
tions and observations.
In large measure, the cases presented here speak for
themselves. As you read through the pages that follow, how-
ever, we suspect that a unifying theme will emerge. Judge
Bright has long been sympathetic to the underdogs of Ameri-
can society, and he maintains keen sensitivities to the prob-
lems of the poor and weak. In his cases on criminal justice,
evidence, and civil rights-areas of our legal profession where
the rubber hits the road and our deepest democratic principles
are tested-we see the outlines of a judicial philosophy which
respects the little guy, the working woman, and the members
of our country's minorities. It is a philosophy with great com-
passion for the suffering and misfortune of others. It under-
stands the human element in the work of the courts and strives
for balance and fairness. Above all, it shows the Honorable
Myron H. Bright to be a man and jurist devoted to effecting the
very object of the law-Justice.
I. CASES IN THE AREA OF CRIMINAL LAW
A. SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS FOR HABEAS CORPUS: THE SAGA OF
JAMES DEAN WALKER
Before Judge Bright reviewed the second habeas corpus
petition of James Dean Walker, two separate juries had con-
victed Walker of murdering a police officer, and the Arkansas
1. 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
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Supreme Court had affirmed his second conviction.2 Moreover,
Walker had previously sought federal habeas corpus relief on
similar grounds, a prayer the Eighth Circuit had denied.
3
Faced with a successive habeas corpus petition filed by a man
twice convicted of murder, many judges would not have de-
voted a significant amount of time to its review. Judge Bright's
perseverance and devotion to the appeal of James Dean
Walker's second habeas corpus petition loudly demonstrates
that the Honorable Myron H. Bright is not like many judges.
The circumstances underlying Walker's original murder
convictions require brief review. On April 16, 1963, James
Dean Walker, Russell Kumpe, Linda Ford, and Mary Louise
Roberts were socializing at a nightclub in Little Rock, Arkan-
sas.4 Following an altercation in which another nightclub pa-
tron suffered a gunshot wound, Walker, Kumpe, and Ford left
the nightclub and began driving out of town in Kumpe's auto-
mobile.5 Roberts followed in a taxicab driven by Aaron Paul
Alderman.6
Acting on a report that Walker and Kumpe had partici-
pated in the nightclub altercation, North Little Rock police of-
ficer Gene Barentine stopped Kumpe's automobile, parking his
squad car directly behind the vehicle.7 Almost immediately
thereafter, Officer Jerrell Vaughan arrived.8 Cabdriver Al-
derman, and another cabdriver, Thomas Short, also arrived on
the scene at the same time as Officer Vaughan.9
Officer Barentine ordered Kumpe out of the driver's side of
the car and began to search him. 0 Vaughan approached the
passenger's side of the car.11 From this point forward, the pre-
cise nature of the ensuing events remains somewhat unclear.
Following an exchange of gunfire, Officer Vaughan suffered a
single, yet mortal gunshot wound to his heart and Walker lay
face down with five gunshot wounds a few feet away from Offi-
2. See Walker v. State, 408 S.W.2d 905 (Ark. 1966).
3. See Walker v. Bishop, 408 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1969).
4. See Walker v. Lockhart, 763 F.2d 942, 945 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Walker v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1238, 1239 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
11. See id.
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cer Vaughan. 12 In his right hand, Walker held a gun that had
not been fired, and which the government conceded was not
used to kill Officer Vaughan.13 Police officers did find a second
gun near Walker, however, which police officers later deter-
mined to be the gun that fired the shot fatal to Officer
Vaughan.14 Kumpe, who tried to escape during the gunfire,
sustained two gunshot wounds from Officer Barentine. 15
The government charged Walker with first degree mur-
der. 16 The government "proceeded on the theory that Walker
shot Vaughan with the gun that was found near his body, and
that Barentine then shot Walker."17 Walker ultimately was
convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death.'8
However, the Arkansas Supreme Court determined that the
trial judge improperly allowed irrelevant and prejudicial tes-
timony, and accordingly reversed Walker's conviction and re-
manded the case for a new trial.19
Before the second trial began, Walker's defense counsel pe-
titioned for a new trial judge, arguing that the trial judge from
the first trial was prejudiced against Walker.20 In support of
this argument, Walker's defense counsel presented undisputed
evidence that the trial judge, upon agreeing to allow Walker to
travel to a church to be baptized, told the officer transporting
Walker that if Walker attempted to escape, the officer should
"shoot him down... because [the judge] intended to burn the
S.O.B. anyway."21 The trial judge rejected the defense's motion
and refused to recuse himself for the second trial.22
Prior to the second trial, defense counsel acquired ballis-
tics evidence showing that Officer Vaughan had shot Walker.23
This evidence contradicted the government's original theory of
the case, which was that Officer Barentine had shot Walker.24
12. Walker v. Lockhart, 763 F.2d at 945.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. See Walker v. State, 388 S.W.2d 13, 18-19 (Ark. 1965).
20. See Walker v. Lockhart, 763 F.2d at 946.
21. Id. (citation omitted).
22 See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
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Consequently, the government was forced to change its theory
for the second trial and asserted instead that Walker fired first
and that Officer Vaughan, before dying, managed to return fire
and shoot Walker five times.25
During the second trial, the government presented most of
the same evidence from Walker's first trial but did not produce
Mary Roberts as a witness because the government maintained
that she was unavailable to testify.26 Consequently, the gov-
ernment was allowed to read into the record Roberts' prior tes-
timony from the first trial.27 At the conclusion of the second
trial, the jury again convicted Walker of first degree murder
but spared his life, sentencing him to life imprisonment.28 The
Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the conviction.29
In response to his second conviction and the unsuccessful
conclusion to his direct line of appeal, Walker filed the first of
his two federal habeas corpus petitions in 1966. The petition
argued, inter alia, that the government had suppressed the ex-
culpatory testimony of Mary Roberts3o and cabdriver Aaron
Paul Alderman, 31 and that the trial judge had been prejudiced
25. See id.
26. See Walker v. Bishop, 295 F. Supp. 767, 776 (E.D. Ark. 1967). During
the first trial, Roberts testified that she did not witness any of the shooting
because she dove into the back seat when the shooting began. See id. at 771.
27. See id. at 771.
28. See id. at 769.
29. See Walker v. State, 408 S.W.2d 905 (Ark. 1966).
30. At the habeas petition hearing, Roberts recanted her testimony and
stated that she did witness the details of the shooting and did not see Walker
fire his gun. See Walker v. Bishop, 295 F. Supp. at 776. Roberts further
stated that certain police officers coerced her into lying at the first trial and
pressured her into leaving town afterwards. See id.
31. At the habeas petition hearing, Alderman testified that he saw Officer
Vaughan fire several shots at Walker and that Officer Vaughan remained
standing after Walker had fallen to the ground. See Walker v. Lockhart, 763
F.2d 942, 946 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane). Alderman further testified that he
then heard a final shot which had a "hollow, muffled sound," after which Offi-
cer Vaughan immediately fell to the ground. Id. Walker argued that this tes-
timony supported a conclusion that Officer Vaughan had been shot by Kumpe
from under the automobile, or had been shot with a bullet that ricocheted
from Officer Barentine's weapon. See Walker v. Bishop, 295 F. Supp. at 779.
Alderman claimed that he gave his statement to police immediately after
the shooting. See Walker v. Lockhart, 763 F.2d at 946. In addition, Alderman
also asserted that, although he later moved to Florida, he called the "criminal
court office" or the prosecuting attorney's office before the first trial to make
himself available as a witness. See id. The government never called Alder-
man as a witness or even notified him about Walker's trials. See id.
1998] 243
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against Walker.32 Following a hearing on the habeas corpus
petition, the district court ruled that the government did not
suppress the testimonial evidence of witnesses Roberts33 and
Alderman,34 and concluded that the trial judge's prejudice
against Walker was not sufficient to deny Walker due proc-
ess.35 Accordingly, the district court denied Walker's petition.36
A panel of the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's or-
der.37
More than a decade later, in 1981, Walker filed a second
habeas corpus petition.38 The district court determined that
Walker had already argued four of the seven claims in his peti-
tion.39 Therefore, the district court analyzed those four claims
under the guidelines for successive habeas petitions and con-
cluded that the "ends of justice" would not be served by a re-
consideration of the repetitious claims. 40 Those claims had
been dismissed on the merits and Walker could point to no in-
tervening change in the law or any new evidence.41 The dis-
trict court found that Walker's newly-asserted claims lacked
substantial merit and, accordingly, denied Walker's second ha-
beas corpus petition.42
Walker appealed, and the Eighth Circuit heard oral argu-
ment. The three-judge panel agreed that Judge Bright should
32. The trial judge made remarks to the jury during the second trial indi-
cating that Walker had been previously tried and convicted of the same
charges. See Walker v. Bishop, 295 F. Supp. at 773.
33. The district court determined that the fact that Roberts did not "see"
Walker discharge his weapon did not negate the possibility that Walker actu-
ally did fire the gun. See id. at 776.
34. The federal district court also discredited the validity of Alderman's
testimony on the issue of suppression because no one could produce Alder-
man's alleged written statement. Alderman could not remember details about
where and how he gave his statement, and Alderman could not identify the
person he informed that he remained available as a witness. See id. at 779.
Furthermore, the district court added that Alderman's version varied from
other witnesses' accounts. See id.
35. See id. at 773, 776, 779.
36. See id. at 780.
37. See Walker v. Bishop, 408 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1969).
38. See Walker v. Lockhart, 514 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Ark. 1981).
39. See id. at 1349-52.
40. See id. The "ends of justice" standard, as applied in this context, re-
fers to the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), which at the time of Walker's petition governed the
determination of successive habeas petitions.
41. See Walker v. Lockhart, 514 F. Supp. at 1350-51.
42. See Walker v. Lockhart, 763 F.2d 942, 947 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane).
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write the opinion for the panel. Judge Bright asked his law
clerk, Patricia Maher, to thoroughly review the entire record.
After a lengthy review of the record, Maher reported to Judge
Bright and said, in her words: "Judge, I believe that James
Dean Walker was framed." Judge Bright was skeptical of her
assessment, but agreed to review the entire record himself be-
fore reaching any definitive conclusions.
For the next several weeks, Judge Bright took advantage
of every free moment to review each document in the volumi-
nous record. When he was finished, he read it again. After
twice reading the entire record, Judge Bright concluded that
Walker had received an unfair trial because of the bias exhib-
ited by the trial judge and the suppression of evidence by the
government. Nevertheless, Judge Bright wanted to be certain
before proceeding. First, he called Judge Gerald Heaney, the
only judge who had heard Walker's appeals on both of his ha-
beas petitions. Then, following a lengthy discussion, both
judges agreed that Walker might be entitled to a new trial,
notwithstanding the Eighth Circuit's previous denial of habeas
corpus relief.43
Ultimately the panel, comprised of Judges Bright, Heaney
and Donald Ross, agreed that because Eighth Circuit rules
prevent one panel from reversing the ruling of a prior panel,
the case should be reviewed by the entire Eighth Circuit if re-
lief was to be granted. At that time, the Eighth Circuit con-
sisted of seven judges in active service. After the en banc court
held its hearing, four judges--Judge Ross, Judge John Gibson,
Judge Richard Arnold, and Judge Theodore McMillian-voted
to deny relief to Walker. Judge Bright, Judge Heaney and
then-Chief Judge Donald Lay comprised the vigorous minority
that voted to grant relief.
Judge Gibson accepted the task of writing the proposed
opinion for the majority and Judge Bright assumed responsi-
43. After their discussion, Judge Heaney sent to Judge Bright the notes
Judge Heaney took during the conference following oral arguments in
Walker's first habeas corpus petition. Those notes indicated that the panel
had agreed to grant habeas relief to Walker and that Judge Mahaffy agreed to
write the opinion in the case. However, as he wrote the opinion, Judge Ma-
haffy determined that Walker should not receive habeas corpus relief. The
other members of the panel apparently agreed with this conclusion.
Judge Bright has repeatedly pointed out that a judicial panel's ultimate
opinion does not always follow the tentative decision reached in conference
after oral arguments. Indeed, in the appeal of Walker's second habeas peti-
tion, the panel tentatively agreed to deny habeas corpus relief to Walker.
24519981
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bility for writing the proposed dissent. However, upon reading
the two proposed opinions, Judge McMillian elected to change
his vote in favor of granting Walker a new trial. Judge McMil-
Han's changed vote, of course, created a 4-3 majority to grant
habeas corpus relief and transformed Judge Bright's dissent
into the majority opinion.
While Judge Bright finalized the majority opinion, how-
ever, two new judges-Judges George Fagg and Pasco Bow-
man-joined the Eighth Circuit. At that time, the Eighth Cir-
cuit had a rule that allowed newly-appointed judges to
participate in pending en banc cases. Consequently, the now
nine-judge en banc court scheduled a rehearing on Walker's
appeal. Following this hearing, Judge Fagg and Judge Bow-
man concluded that Walker should not receive habeas corpus
relief, creating a 5-4 majority to deny relief."
Judge Arnold, although voting with the majority, agreed in
a concurring opinion that Walker had been tried before a
prejudiced trial judge.45 Judge Arnold opined that "[i]f due
process means anything, it means a trial before an unbiased
judge and jury."46 Judge Arnold stated that he did not agree
with the court's 1969 decision denying Walker's first petition,
but added that his mere disagreement with the court's prior
opinion did not justify a successive habeas application. 47
Rather, Judge Arnold stated that granting a successive habeas
petition required something more, such as a change in the law
or "new evidence, unrevealed at the time of the first habeas
proceeding."48
Just when Walker's topsy-turvy habeas corpus petition
appeared to have once again fallen short, his case took another
dramatic turn. Walker filed a petition for recall of the court's
mandate, asserting that new evidence had surfaced which war-
ranted a successive habeas corpus petition. Specifically,
Walker referred to a diary entry written in 1968 by Russell
Kumpe, Walker's companion on the night Officer Vaughan was
killed. Kumpe's diary entry indicated that Kumpe had fired
his gun when Officer Vaughan was shot. In addition, Walker's
counsel offered proof that Kumpe admitted to his former wife
44. See Walker v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
45. See id. at 1249-51 (Arnold, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 1249.
47. See id. at 1250.
48. Id.
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that Kumpe, not Walker, shot the officer and that he, Kumpe,
wished that he had also killed Walker.
Judge Arnold concluded that the new material "sufficiently
add[ed] to the uncertain[ties] of this case to justify additional
proceedings," 49 and on that basis he changed his vote. Joining
the four dissenters from the previous ruling, he helped to cre-
ate a new majority to grant Walker's motion to recall the man-
date and to remand the case to the district court for a hearing.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing, but concluded
that the record contained no credible evidence meriting a new
trial.50
After years of having his arguments rejected and losing his
appeals, Walker's appeal of the district court's ruling ulti-
mately provided the relief he sought-his freedom. By a vote of
5-4, the Eighth Circuit granted Walker's habeas corpus peti-
tion and ordered a new trial.51 Judge Bright, writing the ma-
jority opinion, ruled that the new evidence provided by
Kumpe's diary entries and the testimony of Kumpe's former
wife "tip[ped the balance of the ends of justice standard to
permit this court to reconsider Walker's habeas petition."52 In
addition, Judge Bright noted the vast importance of another
piece of exculpatory evidence that the government had only re-
cently disclosed to Walker's defense counsel. Interestingly, the
government disclosed to Walker's counsel "a most extraordi-
nary and revealing piece of evidence: a transcript of a surrepti-
tiously recorded conversation" between Kumpe and his sister,
Mildred Eisner.5 3 According to the transcript, Kumpe stated:
Now look, I am going to explain something to you. You understand
that I did shoot at that policeman and he will go crazy trying to figure
out what happened to the gun. If they place the gun in my hand
naturally they could, no, they couldn't either cause [sic] I had been
back in his custody, I don't know what they could have done and at
the time I didn't care fro [sic] everybody was shooting at everybody
49. Id. at 1267 (Arnold, J., concurring). Judge Arnold, in a separate con-
currence to the order recalling the mandate, observed that if the new evidence
could establish that Kumpe had in fact fired his gun on the night in question,
such evidence would give credibility to Alderman's account of the shooting,
which exonerates Walker and had never been heard by a court. See id. at
1265.
50. See Walker v. Lockhart, 598 F. Supp. 1410, 1434 (E.D. Ark. 1984).
5L See Walker v. Lockhart, 763 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
52. Id. at 960.
53. Id. at 955.
2471998]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
else and I had some things on me that would have got me a hundred
years. I had to get rid of them.-4
With respect to this evidence, Judge Bright stated:
[Tihe Kumpe-Eisner transcript contains exculpatory evidence,
[which] has been in the State's possession for over twenty years ....
[Tihe State's failure to disclose it-despite sweeping discovery re-
quests and a 1967 court order directing the State to turn over all ma-
terial held on James Dean Walker--creates an independent basis for
granting habeas relief.5
Judge Bright concluded the opinion by stating that the
newly discovered evidence allowed the court, "in order to attain
the ends of justice," to reach its ultimate ruling that the trial
judge's prejudice against Walker created a "gross miscarriage
of justice."56
The State of Arkansas appealed the Eighth Circuit's rul-
ing, but the Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari.57 In-
stead of retrying the case, however, Walker and the govern-
ment reached a plea bargain. By agreement, Walker pleaded
guilty to a lesser offense that carried a maximum sentence less
than that already served by Walker. Walker became a free
man.
In Judge Bright's view, the Walker case illustrates the
very root principle that has undergirded the writ of habeas
corpus since its pre-Constitutional introduction into our body
of common law. It demonstrates that The Great Writ of Lib-
erty maintains its vitality, and that it can and should serve as
a very real vehicle of justice for those unjustly incarcerated.
The Observations of Patricia L. Maher58
I first became aware of James Dean Walker when I was
assigned to work on an opinion regarding his habeas corpus
petition, brought while he was a prisoner in Arkansas. Walker
claimed that he had been tried without due process of law in a
state court and convicted of first degree murder in the 1963
shooting death of a Little Rock policeman. Walker's appeal
from the denial of his habeas petition came before the Eighth
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 960-61.
57. See Lockhart v. Walker, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986).
58. Patricia L. Maher, a litigation specialist, served as law clerk to Judge
Bright from 1981-82. She is a graduate of the Georgetown Law Center and
after a lengthy career in private practice, she has recently returned to public
service in the Civil Division of the Department of Justice.
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Circuit with a strong presumption against granting him relief;
he had previously filed a similar habeas petition in 1967 that
was denied by the district court in Arkansas and affirmed by
the Eighth Circuit. In his subsequent habeas petition, in 1982,
Walker argued that his prior state trials had denied him due
process of law on two grounds: he had been tried by a biased
judge who had expressed his intention to "burn" him, and the
police and prosecutors had suppressed exculpatory evidence.
Under guidelines established by the Supreme Court in Sanders
v. United States,59 the court could not reconsider arguments
that had been made in the earlier petition if the first petition
was decided on the merits and the ends of justice would not be
served by reaching the merits of the later application.
After the panel heard arguments on Walker's habeas peti-
tion and his related civil rights claim-namely, that his life
would be endangered if he were placed in an Arkansas state
prison-Judge Bright was designated to write the opinion for
the panel. After the conference, he told me that the panel was
inclined to deny the petition because it was largely duplicative
of the original habeas petition and the same arguments could
not be reconsidered. Nevertheless, Judge Bright said that the
panel would want to state that it was denying the petition
"after review of the entire record before the court." In order to
do so, someone would actually have to review the record. I was
that someone.
It was hard for me to muster much enthusiasm for the
project. I knew the panel likely would deny the petition be-
cause Walker was relying on essentially the same grounds that
he had in his original petition, which had been decided on the
merits. In addition, I was discouraged by the voluminous rec-
ord-especially the many dog-eared transcripts dating back
more than fifteen years. For working space, I moved the boxes
of transcripts into the vacant chambers that had belonged to
the late Judge Vogel, Judge Bright's friend and predecessor on
the court. I began to spend my afternoons alone in the empti-
ness reading transcripts. I worked my way backwards through
the habeas proceedings in the district court in Arkansas, to the
earlier opinion of the Eighth Circuit, and then back to the
original habeas proceeding that Walker had filed in 1967. At
some point, I discovered that we did not even have a complete
set of the transcripts from Walker's state trials. We had to lo-
59. 373 U.s. 1 (1963).
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cate them and ensure their delivery to Judge Bright's cham-
bers.
As I read through the old transcripts, I began to question
the evidence of Walker's guilt, in part because the State's the-
ory that Walker had killed Officer Vaughan seemed to rest on a
physical impossibility. At the first trial, the State contended
that Walker shot first and had been injured by shots from the
officer on the driver's side, Officer Barentine. When ballistics
evidence later demonstrated that Walker had been wounded by
shots from Officer Vaughan's gun, the State simply changed its
theory to comport with that evidence. The State still con-
tended that Walker had shot first, hitting Officer Vaughan in
the heart; Officer Vaughan then somehow managed to dis-
charge six rounds from his weapon, five of which hit Walker.
The State's theory failed to account for the fact that the
bullet that killed Officer Vaughan did not come from the gun in
Walker's hand, which had not been fired at all. Another gun
had allegedly been found underneath Walker, but it was un-
clear whether Walker could have used that gun to fire the fatal
shot. The second gun had been seen by one of the taxi drivers
named Alderman. Alderman had given a statement to police
describing the events he witnessed, including the fact that
Vaughan was still standing after Walker had fallen out of the
car. Although Alderman was an eyewitness with crucial in-
formation, the State never gave Alderman's name to Walker's
attorneys. In addition, although Alderman told the prosecutor
he would be available to testify and provided him with his new
address when he moved out of the state, the State did not call
him as a witness at trial. It was not until the first habeas pro-
ceeding that he finally told his story.
At the first habeas proceeding, Alderman testified that he
saw Officer Vaughan approach the passenger side of the car
and order the passenger to get out with his hands up. Alder-
man testified that he saw Vaughan fire at Walker, and that
Vaughan remained standing after Walker had fallen out of the
car. There was a pause in the shooting, and then Alderman
heard one more shot that he described as sounding like a shot
in a barrel or a pipe. After all of the shooting stopped, Alder-
man approached Walker and removed a fully-loaded gun from
his hand. Alderman also took a gun from Officer Vaughan's
hand and observed that all six rounds had been fired from it.
Alderman also noticed another gun near the back of the car
where Kumpe had been during the shooting. Alderman gave
[Vol. 83:239
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both of the guns he had retrieved to the police and pointed out
the location of the third gun under the car to an officer on the
scene. That was the gun that allegedly was "found" under
Walker.
Because Alderman had given a statement to police at the
scene, and was indisputably a material witness to the events
that resulted in Officer Vaughan's death, I was extremely
troubled to learn from the record of the first habeas proceeding
that he had never been contacted by state prosecutors to testify
at trial. It did not seem to be coincidental that the police had
never given Alderman's name to Walker's attorneys; Alder-
man's testimony did not fit with the State's theory at both tri-
als that Walker had fired the first shot.
Other significant testimony that was not heard until the
first habeas proceeding was the testimony of Mary Roberts,
who recanted her testimony at the first trial that she had not
seen the shooting. That testimony had been read into the rec-
ord at the second trial based on the prosecutor's naked repre-
sentation that Ms. Roberts was "unavailable" to testify in per-
son. The trial judge denied Walker's counsel even a brief
recess to produce Ms. Roberts, whom the defense contended
was living in Little Rock.
At the first habeas proceeding, Mary Roberts testified that
she had advised the police prior to the second trial that she in-
tended to change her testimony to reflect that she had seen Of-
ficer Vaughan fire the first shot, and that she never saw
Walker fire his gun at all. When she told police of her intent to
testify truthfully at the second trial, Roberts said, the police
"suggested" that she leave town before the trial.
Although the court allowed the State to read in the testi-
mony of Linda Ford and Mary Roberts based on their
"unavailability," the court concurrently refused to allow the de-
fense to read into the record a ballistics report produced by a
recognized expert from Minnesota, ostensibly because the
author of the report was not present in the courtroom. The re-
port itself cast doubt on whether the gun allegedly found near
Walker was the murder weapon at all.
After working my way through the record, I told Judge
Bright that I had found no direct evidence of Walker's guilt.
My concern about the lack of evidence available to show that
Walker had fired the fatal shot at Officer Vaughan was height-
ened by apparent impropriety by the police and prosecutors in
suppressing the testimony of Alderman and Roberts. My con-
1998]
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clusion, after reading the record, was that the gun Alderman
saw under the car had been "dropped" near Walker and used
as the basis of the murder charge against him. Although
Walker was certainly no choirboy, I was convinced after re-
viewing the entire record that he had been unfairly tried and
convicted-twice-of murdering Officer Vaughan.
I told Judge Bright about my concerns, generally at first
and then in greater detail as he became increasingly interested
in what he heard about the actual contents of the record. He
questioned me in detail about the facts, and I described for him
the problems that I perceived had denied Walker due process
of law. Eventually, Judge Bright began to spend his own af-
ternoons in Judge Vogel's chambers, reading through the rec-
ord himself. As he did so, I researched the case law governing
successive habeas petitions and eventually concluded that this
was a case in which the court was not precluded from reaching
the merits of Walker's habeas petition. Although it was suc-
cessive, the ends of justice would be served by hearing the peti-
tion and reversing such a gross denial of due process.
By the time I finished my clerkship in August 1982, Judge
Bright had embarked on the long, difficult, and, frankly, politi-
cal process of persuading other members of the Court that the
interests of finality should give way to the interests of justice.
His efforts in this regard led to a decision by the full court in
January of 1984, Walker v. Lockhart,60 in which the Court
ruled 5-4 to deny Walker habeas relief. Judge Bright, of
course, wrote the dissent for three other members of the Court.
That decision was followed the next year by Walker v. Lock-
hart,61 in which Judge Bright authored the opinion for the 5-4
majority, granting Walker habeas corpus relief on the basis of
newly discovered evidence.
The Observations of James Dean Walker
Perhaps the most elegant and poignant statement con-
cerning the impact of Judge Bright's jurisprudence is to be
found in the original voices of the litigants, petitioners and de-
fendants for whom he has risen. To that end, we save for last
the brave and grateful thoughts of James Dean Walker, as they
were expressed in an unsolicited, handwritten letter. Truly,
they need no other comment.
60. 726 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1984) (en bane).
61. 763 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
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January 4, 1991
Dear Judge Bright-
I have attempted numerous times to write this letter to you, each
time never feeling that the letter adequately expressed my feelings.
Perhaps I can do better this time.
It's very difficult to know exactly how to express one's gratitude to
a person who is largely responsible for saving your life. I am, also,
not certain whether it's proper for an "ex-con" to write to a judge to
say "thank you," but I feel so much time has elapsed since your opin-
ion set me free that I may now write and avoid any "appearance of
impropriety." If I am breaching some judicial ethic by writing to you,
then I ask that you forgive me.
I'm certainly one of the truly fortunate people in this world-
fortunate to have survived years of brutalizing conditions, and even
more fortunate to have so many true friends who gave so much love
and support and hope to me during those many years of confinement
under the foulest of conditions. It's difficult to look at the bleakest of
circumstances for years duration and not lose hope. Thank you for
letting my deepest hopes not be in vain.
At the time I was on death row, and during later years in Arkan-
sas' prison and especially after my capture from escape and extradi-
tion back to Arkansas, and those years in solitary confinement, I had
no idea that a judge from Fargo, North Dakota would be the person
to become so offended by an injustice that occurred in Arkansas some
18 years earlier. I thank you for your integrity and for your willing-
ness to fight to correct what you so aptly labeled a "stain on our
criminal justice system."
I owe much to some fine and brilliant attorneys-Mr. Oscar
Fendler, Mr. Bill Bristow, Mr. Paul Halvonik, Mr. Gene Worsham-
all of whom were offended by the gross miscarriage of justice that
they recognized in my case. But their legal efforts would have been
for naught had it not been for the fact that you were willing to uphold
the integrity of your position and push to set right a very serious
wrong. I thank you, sir, for your beliefs, and I thank God that we
still live in a society where such a wrong can be corrected-even 22
years late. Perhaps my case proved that there should never be a
"doctrine of finality."
My stupidity and lack of direction as a youth led to one half of my
adult life being stripped from me. Those years can never be re-
gained-yet I'm thankful for the fact that those years were not en-
tirely lost. I came through a very ugly ordeal gaining much more
than was taken from me. I survived with most of my sanity, most of
my health, and most of my dignity and self-respect. I thank you for
allowing me to do so.
I would like very much to some day meet you in person-to shake
your hand and embrace you-to thank you. That may never be pos-
sible, so I ask that you accept the words of this letter as words from
my heart. They are all I have to offer at this time.
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In closing, I say thank you so very much for giving my life and
freedom back to me. It's my prayer that your life may continue to be
blessed in the most abundant ways.
Sincerely-
James Dean Walker.62
B. THE 8TH AMENDMENT, PROPORTIONALITY & PUNISHMENT:
HELM V. SOLEM
For those interested in and concerned with the modern
American system of criminal justice, the reach of the Eighth
Amendment and the application of its proscription against
cruel and unusual punishment is something of an enigma. On
the one hand, the Eighth Amendment seems, at face value, to
offer the possibility of robust protection for those convicted of
crimes in our society. On the other hand, it has never been
among those elements of the Bill of Rights-the First Amend-
ment's free speech component and the Fifth Amendment's due
process protections come to mind as prominent examples-
which have been energetically pursued or stretched to their
logical extreme. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has
often appeared contradictory in its approach to the Eighth
Amendment. This fact has left the lower federal courts, and
judges like Myron Bright, to flesh out distinctions in the
Court's jurisprudence in a manner that does its best to pre-
serve justice. The following case illustrates the point.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit once had its
staff attorneys review appeals. The staff attorney would rec-
ommend either that the district court decision be summarily
affirmed or that the appeal be scheduled for oral argument.
When Henry Buckley Helm appealed from the district court's
denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, the staff attor-
ney recommended summary affirmance of the district court's
decision. Fortunately for Helm, however, Judge Bright disa-
greed with that recommendation.
Helm pleaded guilty to the charge of "uttering a no account
check for $100."63 At the time, that offense under South Da-
kota law carried a maximum penalty of five years and $5,000.64
62. Copy on file with the Minnesota Law Review; original in possession of
Judge Bright.
63. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281 (1983) (footnote omitted).
64. See id. at 281 (citation omitted).
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A South Dakota statute addressing habitual criminality, how-
ever, enhanced the maximum. When a defendant received a
felony conviction and had "'at least three prior convictions in
addition to the principal felony, the sentence for the principal
felony shall be enhanced to the sentence for a Class 1 felony. " 65
At sentencing, Helm ignored his counsel's recommendations
and admitted to six prior convictions. 66
Following Helm's revelation, the trial judge sentenced him
to life imprisonment.67 Under South Dakota law, '[a] person
sentenced to life imprisonment [was] not eligible for parole by
the board of pardons and paroles.'"68 Therefore, unless Helm
received a pardon or a commutation of his sentence, he faced
prison for the rest of his life.69 Helm appealed his sentence, ar-
guing that his sentence of life imprisonment without parole
denied him due process and was tantamount to cruel and un-
usual punishment.70 The Supreme Court of South Dakota, by a
3-2 vote, rejected Helm's arguments and affirmed the imposi-
tion of the sentence of life imprisonment.7'
Helm filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the
federal district court.72 Helm argued that his due process
rights had been violated and that his life sentence without pa-
role violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.73 In an unpublished opinion, the district court denied
Helm's petition.7 4 Discarding his due process argument on ap-
peal, Helm argued solely that his life sentence without parole
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.75 This argument,
although of a certain visceral appeal, appeared to be controlled
65. Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582, 582 n.2 (8th Cir. 1982) (quoting S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-7-8 (1979)).
66. See id. at 582.
67. See id. at 583.
68. Id. (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 24-15-4 (1979)).
69. See id. at 583.
70. See State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 498 (S.D. 1980).
71. See id. at 499.
72. See Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d at 583.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 583-84. The district court determined that because Helm
waived his right to a pre-sentence investigation, he could not argue that the
sentencing judge violated his due process rights by sentencing him without
conducting a pre-sentence investigation. See id. at 584. Regarding Helm's
argument that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment, the
district court determined that United States Supreme Court precedent forced
it to reach the conclusion that Helm's arguments lacked merit. See id.
75. See id. at 584.
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and adversely determined by a United States Supreme Court
decision in a seemingly similar case.
In Rummel v. Estelle, only a few years earlier, the Su-
preme Court upheld Rummel's mandatory life sentence under
a Texas recidivist statute.76 When convicted for obtaining
$120.75 under false pretenses, Rummel had two prior felony
convictions on his record. 77 Having triggered the recidivist en-
hancement, Rummel received the mandatory life sentence.78
On appeal, he challenged his sentence as cruel and unusual
punishment on grounds that the sentence was disproportionate
to the offense committed.7 9 The Court rejected Rummel's ar-
guments, reasoning that assigning penalties to crimes was the
province of the legislature, rather than the judiciary.80 The
Court in Rummel, however, left a small opening in its language
and did not foreclose the possibility that a sentence might be so
disproportionate as to be unconstitutional. The Court noted:
"This is not to say that a proportionality principle would not
come into play in the extreme example mentioned by the dis-
sent, if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punish-
able by life imprisonment."81
Judge Bright, writing for the panel, distinguished Helm's
life sentence from the life sentence in Rummel because the
Texas recidivist sentencing scheme allowed for the possibility
of parole, whereas South Dakota's sentencing system did not.82
Accordingly, Judge Bright stated that Rummel did not fore-
close a ruling that Helm's sentence constituted cruel and un-
usual punishment.83 In pronouncing that Helm's sentence was
unconstitutionally disproportionate to his offense, Judge
Bright compared South Dakota's recidivist scheme with the
"collective judgment of the fifty state legislatures and the na-
ture of the offense."84 In so doing, Judge Bright noted that
Helm could not have received a life sentence without parole in
76. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980).
77. See id. at 266. Rummel's two prior convictions were for passing a
forged check in the amount of $28.36 and fraudulently using a credit card to
obtain $80 worth of goods or services. See id. at 265-66.
78. See id. at 266.
79. See id. at 267.
80. See id. at 284-85.
81. Id. at 274 n.11 (internal citation omitted).
82. See Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582, 585 (8th Cir. 1982).
83. See id.
84. Id. at 586.
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forty-eight of the fifty states.85  He explained that "[olther
states either do not authorize such a drastic sanction for habit-
ual offenders, or require at least one prior felony conviction for
a violent crime as a prerequisite to a sentence of life imprison-
ment without parole."86
Moreover, in comparing Helm's sentence to the nature of
the offense, Judge Bright observed that all of Helm's prior fel-
ony convictions in some manner resulted from Helm's alcohol-
ism, a condition that Judge Bright stated was "amenable to
treatment."87 Judge Bright concluded that imposing a life sen-
tence without the possibility of parole constituted cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.88 Accordingly, the panel of the Eighth Circuit
ordered resentencing for Helm. 89
The State appealed the Eighth Circuit's ruling to the
United States Supreme Court. To the surprise of many, how-
ever, Judge Bright was vindicated by the Court and his distinc-
tion validated. The Supreme Court affirmed, basing its own
analysis very closely on that outlined by Judge Bright.90
The Observations of Michael J. Schaffer9l
I served as a law clerk to Judge Bright for one year in 1981
and 1982. I remember one day Judge Bright called me into his
office. He handed me the briefs in the case of Helm v. Solem
and told me that the case had been screened by a staff attorney
for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals for no argument and
summary affirmance. I remember Judge Bright telling me that
he felt the case deserved oral argument. At Judge Bright's re-
quest, the court set Helm v. Solem for oral argument. The ar-
gument itself took place at the University of South Dakota
School of Law, in the state where the case originated and coin-
cidentally, my home state.
85. See id.
86. Id. (footnote omitted).
87. Id. at 587.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288-303 (1983). Justice Blackmun,
who joined the 5-4 majority in Solem, had earlier joined the 5-4 majority in
Rummel.
91. Michael J. Schaffer is a graduate of the University of North Dakota
School of Law. He now practices as a litigator in Sioux Falls, South Dakota,
where he is a partner with the firm of Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith,
L.L.P.
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After the argument and the judges' panel conference,
Judge Bright informed me that the panel had tentatively voted
to reverse the district court with directions to issue the writ of
habeas corpus. Judge Bright said that, in his opinion, Helm's
sentence, life without parole, constituted cruel and unusual
punishment given the petty nature of the offense and the fact
that Helm's alcoholism had contributed to each of his crimes.
He then asked me to help him draft the opinion.
I pointed out to Judge Bright that the United States Su-
preme Court had very recently upheld a similar sentence, in
Rummel v. Estelle, against an Eighth Amendment attack.
Judge Bright, however, remained adamant that Rummel was
distinguishable because the Texas sentencing scheme, which
included the possibility for parole in a life sentence, was quali-
tatively different from the South Dakota sentence that Helm
received.
I also pointed out to the Judge, as did the State of South
Dakota, that the United States Supreme Court, just months
before, had handed down Hutto v. Davis.92 In Hutto, the Su-
preme Court reversed the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit and rejected a prisoner's claim that a forty-
year sentence for the possession of nine ounces of marijuana
was cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court, in a
per curiam opinion, also had chastised the Fourth Circuit for
not following its recent decision in Rummel, and in so doing,
commented, "unless we wish anarchy to prevail within the fed-
eral judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed
by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the
judges of those courts may think it to be."93 I recall Judge
Bright's response as if it were yesterday: "If this be judicial an-
archy, make the most of it." For those of you who know Judge
Bright and his gregariousness and sense of humor, his com-
ments were followed with hearty laughter.
We then set about the serious task of writing the opinion.
Judge Bright felt strongly that the Eighth Amendment's prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishment required a pro-
portionality analysis in sentences other than just death sen-
tences. He asked me to research the laws of the other states to
determine whether Helm could have received a sentence of life
without the possibility of parole elsewhere. He sent me to the
92. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam).
93. Id. at 375.
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nearest law school, the University of North Dakota, which had
a collection of the codes for all fifty states. I recall the pains-
taking effort it took to go through the criminal codes. Unfortu-
nately, each state's criminal code was unique in its classifica-
tion of crimes and punishments. I recall thinking at the time
that it would have been nice if there would have been a uni-
form criminal code, similar to the Uniform Commercial Code.
In any event, my research revealed that in only one other state
could Helm have possibly received the sentence that was
handed down in South Dakota.
I have many fond memories of my clerkship with Judge
Bright, but I will always remember how he took a case that
had been designated for summary affirmance, got it placed on
the oral argument calendar, and crafted an opinion that ulti-
mately was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.
What Judge Bright did in Helm v. Solem was not judicial anar-
chy but an exercise of persuasion and compassion by a man
who will always be "the Judge" to me.
C. CASES ON SENTENCING
One of the most profound changes in the arena of federal
criminal law over the past thirty years has been the advent of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Promulgated pursuant to
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,94 the Guidelines seek to
impose a uniform system of punishment by requiring sentenc-
ing courts to select terms of imprisonment from a discrete
range of options provided by the United States Sentencing
Commission for each criminal offense. The downside to this
scheme, of course, is that it largely removes the discretion typi-
cally wielded by judges and substantially limits a court's power
to craft sentences that reflect the nuanced equities of individ-
ual cases.
Judge Bright has been a regular and vocal critic of the
Guidelines, particularly with respect to their application in the
context of non-violent drug-related offenses. 95 These crimes are
94. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 145 F.3d 959, 966 (8th Cir. 1998)
(Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("In this case, the lowest
person on the totem pole, a mere street-level seller with an I.Q. of fifty-three
received a heavier sentence than the mastermind of the conspiracy and the
conspiracy's primary drug supplier. What kind of system could produce such
a result?"); United States v. Romero, 118 F.3d 576, 582 (8th Cir. 1997) (Bright,
J., dissenting) ("This case provides a typical, yet disturbing glimpse into the
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often treated very harshly under the Guidelines and, perhaps,
out of all reasonable proportion to the harm offenders of such
laws actually impose on our society. To his credit, Judge
Bright's criticism has been frank and open. Recently, during
oral argument in United States v. Jones,96 for example, the fol-
lowing exchange occurred:
PROSECUTOR: Judge Bright, I know you're no fan of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines.
JUDGE BRIGHT: That's an understatement.
The judiciary as a whole has been divided in its response
to the Guidelines. Although Judge Bright has occasionally per-
suaded his colleagues to follow his example, more often he has
been left in dissent. But regardless of the majority view, he
believes that the principle of judicial discretion in criminal sen-
tencing is a value worth preserving. To that end, he has se-
lected two cases to highlight here. Both illustrate the legal
reasoning and common sense rationales that support his views.
1. United States v. Hiveley
Judge Bright's most comprehensive critique of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines appeared in a concurrence to the per cu-
riam opinion in United States v. Hiveley.97 In Hiveley, two
members of a drug conspiracy, Larry Edward Hiveley and An-
sil Ezra Henry, received sentences of 234 months and 260
months, respectively.98 Neither Hiveley nor Henry had a seri-
ous criminal history or posed a serious threat to society.99
Judge Bright, viewing this case as a "paradigm of what judges
often see in the sentencing of drug law offenders," 100 used this
occasion to point out the excessive and needless costs that re-
underbelly of prosecuting non-violent, first time drug offenders under manda-
tory minimum sentences."); United States v. Griffin, 17 F.3d 269, 273-75 (8th
Cir. 1994) (Bright, J., dissenting) (dispelling the myth of consistency in sen-
tences under the Sentencing Guidelines); United States v. Goebel, 898 F.2d
675, 678 (8th Cir. 1990) (Bright, J., concurring) (opining that the Sentencing
Guidelines produce unjust sentences among similar offenders); United States
v. O'Meara, 895 F.2d 1216, 1221 (8th Cir. 1990) (Bright, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("This case opens the window on the sometimes bi-
zarre and topsy-turvy world of sentencing under the Guidelines.").
96. 145 F.3d 959 (8th Cir. 1998).
97. United States v. Hiveley, 61 F.3d 1358 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
98. See id. at 1360.
99. See id. at 1363-64 (Bright, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 1363.
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sult from the application of the Sentencing Guidelines and the
mandatory minimum penalties.101
In his concurring opinion, Judge Bright first sought to dis-
pel the notion that lengthy sentences were an effective tool to
discourage drug distribution. Specifically, he noted that "[iun
this writer's opinion based on hearing many drug cases on ap-
peal over twenty-seven years, it is doubtful that heavy sen-
tences for low-level drug offenders have aided the war on
drugs. It has only increased the cost to the public."102
To illustrate the enormous costs to the public, Judge
Bright pointed out that both Hiveley and Henry received sen-
tences that were ten years longer than any reasonable judge
would have ordered without the Sentencing Guidelines. 10 3
Considering that the cost to incarcerate a prisoner is approxi-
mately $22,000 per year, Judge Bright stated that the addi-
tional, and needless, cost associated with the incarceration of
Hiveley and Henry for an additional ten years amounted to
nearly $440,000.104
To further illustrate the magnitude of these unwarranted
additional costs nationwide, Judge Bright referred to a 1994
study, conducted by the Department of Justice, on low-level
drug offenders with insignificant criminal histories-offenders
similar in all respects to Hiveley and Henry. According to the
study, sentences of low-level drug offenders "have increased
150% above what they were prior to sentencing guidelines and
mandatory minimum sentences."'105 Furthermore, the study
also indicated that the federal government was currently in-
carcerating 16,316 low-level drug offenders, amounting to
36.1% of all drug offenders. 06 Therefore, Judge Bright calcu-
lated, [iIlf these same low-level drug offenders serve an extra
five years of imprisonment over what is a proper, non-
guideline, sentence, the cost to the taxpayers exceeds one and
three-quarters billion dollars ($1,794,760,000.00). And still
that is only part of the story."i07
101. See id.
102. Id. at 1364.
103. See id. at 1363-64.
104. See id. at 1364.
105. Id. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN ANALYSIS OF NON-VIOLENT
DRUG OFFENDERS WITH MINIMAL CRIMIINAL HISTORIES 3 (1994)).
106. See id. at 1364.
107. Id. at 1365.
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Although Judge Bright's attack on the Sentencing Guide-
lines focuses primarily on the financial costs to the taxpayers,
the value that propels Judge Bright's concurrence in Hiveley,
as well as his other commentaries in Sentencing Guideline
cases, is his firm belief that the Sentencing Guidelines and
mandatory minimum sentences promote and establish injus-
tice as the norm in sentencing federal offenders. In Hiveley,
Judge Bright observed, "[als an appellate judge, I have seen
draconian sentences [meted] out in drug cases where an of-
fender has had no contact with any drugs but may be only a
minor functionary in a drug conspiracy where heavy amounts
of drugs could be involved." 08
The Observations of Jonathan S. Rosen'0 9
During my clerkship with Judge Bright from 1994 to 1995,
I learned that his fairness, practicality, and ability to craft
creative solutions to problems make his judging exceptional.
United States v. Hiveley represents a model of the injustice
caused by the excessively long sentences required by the man-
datory minimum sentencing provisions and the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines. In addition, Hiveley exemplifies how Judge
Bright never forgets that appellants are real people, with
families and lives to lead.
During the year that I clerked, it was apparent that the
Sentencing Guidelines caused Judge Bright great concern, es-
pecially when excessive sentences were prescribed for low-level
drug offenders. In these cases, non-violent offenders, who had
only minor roles in drug conspiracies, face sentences decades
long because the lengths of their sentences correlate with the
shear weight of the drugs involved in the overall conspiracy
and not with their individual culpability. These low-level drug
offenders are non-violent individuals with minimal or no prior
criminal histories and their offenses do not constitute sophisti-
cated criminal activity. The facts of Hiveley were not unique.
A federal jury found Ansil Ezra Henry and Larry Edward Hiv-
eley guilty of conspiracy to distribute marijuana. The district
court sentenced Henry to twenty-one years eight months and
108. Id.
109. Jonathan S. Rosen served as law clerk to the Honorable Alex T. How-
ard, Jr., Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Alabama from 1992-93 before serving as law clerk to Judge Bright
from 1994-95. He is a graduate of the New York University School of Law and
now practices as an attorney for AT & T Corp. in Basking Ridge, New Jersey.
[Vol. 83:239262
JUDGE MYRON H. BRIGHT
Hiveley to nineteen years six months of imprisonment in ac-
cordance with the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions
and the requirements of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Henry and Hiveley appealed the sentences. Judge Bright
looked to the backgrounds of Henry and Hiveley and saw many
factors which led him to doubt that any reasonable judge, un-
fettered by the Sentencing Guidelines, would have sentenced
these men to more than ten years. Henry was forty-four years
old. He had no prior serious criminal convictions and only
three prior misdemeanor-type crimes. Henry could neither
read nor write and would reach sixty-five years of age in
prison. Hiveley was forty-eight years old at the time of sen-
tencing, and although he had some brushes with the law in his
youth, he had zero criminal history points under the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines. Rather than serving reasonable sentences,
Hiveley and Henry were to spend the rest of their adult lives
behind bars, with little or no chance of returning from jail as
productive members of society.
In addition to the personal toll that the Sentencing Guide-
lines take on the individual defendants and their families, the
financial toll of imprisoning people for decades and the Guide-
lines' effect on the federal budget disturbed Judge Bright as
well. The economic impact of excessively long mandatory
minimum sentences had special significance in 1994 and 1995.
During that year, cuts in the federal budget loomed large. In
fact, little more than six months after the Eighth Circuit de-
cided Hiveley, the federal government shut down for weeks be-
cause Congress could not agree on a budget. The fact that the
long prison sentences meant big bills for the federal govern-
ment and taxpayers had special relevance that year.
I worked with Judge Bright not only to draft the per cu-
riam opinion, but also to craft a concurrence that would reach
beyond Hiveley and speak to all cases where injustice results
from applying the mandatory minimum provisions and the
Sentencing Guidelines to low-level, non-violent drug offenders.
These cases are tragic because the harsh sentencing destroys
offenders' lives, does not win the "War on Drugs," and costs the
government, and hence taxpayers, billions of dollars.
Judge Bright brought his extraordinary sense of fairness
and practicality to the sentencing of these two men and re-
vealed the Sentencing Guidelines' true cost to society. In addi-
tion, he had the courage of his convictions to speak out and
comment upon an unreasonable system and urged other judges
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to do the same. But this is not unusual. During his thirty
years of service to the Eighth Circuit, extraordinary fairness,
common sense practicality, and an ability to craft creative solu-
tions to difficult problems have been the hallmark of Judge
Bright's jurisprudence.
2. United States v. Romero
There is a second case worthy of note with respect to Judge
Bright's staunch views on criminal sentencing; a case that
"provides a disturbing glimpse into the underbelly of prose-
cuting non-violent, first time drug offenders under mandatory
minimum sentences.""10 Taken from Judge Bright's opening
sentence in his dissent in United States v. Romero, this quota-
tion surely commands the reader's attention and colorfully il-
lustrates his hearty distaste for the present system of sen-
tencing federal drug offenders.
Donna Romero pled guilty to the interstate transport of
heroin with her husband, Antonio Grajeda.111 The probation
office prepared a "Disclosure Copy" of her presentence report,
in which the probation officer concluded that Romero met the
requirements for "safety valve" relief from the five-year man-
datory minimum sentence.1 12 The Assistant United States At-
torney handling the case, however, objected to an application of
the safety valve. In response, the probation office reversed its
determination and stated in its final report that "Romero was
possibly more involved [in the drug conspiracy] than outlined
in the presentence report."113 To support this new theory, the
prosecutor proffered the testimony of Romero's husband. Gra-
110. United States v. Weekly, 128 F.3d 1198, 1198 (8th Cir.) (Bright, J.,
dissenting), modifying 118 F.3d 576, 582 (8th Cir.) (Bright, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 611 (1997). The original appeal was brought in the
name of the three defendants, but Judge Bright's dissent dealt only with one
of those defendants, Donna Romero. Because the Judge always has referred
to his opinion as the Romero dissent, this article shall hereinafter refer to the
case as United States v. Romero.
111. See Romero, 118 F.3d at 580.
112. See id. To qualify for "safety valve" relief, a defendant must not have
more than one criminal history point, must not have employed violence in the
commission of the crime, directly or indirectly caused serious physical harm,
or served as the "organizer" of the crime. See Romero, 128 F.3d at 1199
(Bright, J., dissenting). The "safety valve" allows a district judge "to sentence
a defendant below the statutory mandatory minimum, but within the Sen-
tencing Guideline Range," thereby relieving some of the moral pressure which
accumulates in cases of otherwise manifest disproportionality. Id.
113. Romero, 118 F.3d at 580.
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jeda testified that Romero controlled the drug movements and
that "he merely joined her for the ride."114 To bolster Grajeda's
credibility, the prosecutor presented the district judge with a
federal drug enforcement agent's testimony that Grajeda had
taken and passed a polygraph test.115 The polygraph examiner,
however, did not testify at the hearing and the prosecutor did
not present any report from the polygraph examination.
116
Based on the purported results of Grajeda's polygraph exami-
nation, the district court determined that Romero did not meet
her burden of showing that she had truthfully provided the
government with all information about the offense. 117
A three-judge panel affirmed the district court's determi-
nation. 18 Judge Bright dissented. He began his dissent by
criticizing the district court's reliance on the "worthless" evi-
dence introduced regarding Grajeda's lie detector test.119 Al-
though acknowledging that the usual evidentiary rules do not
apply in the context of sentencing hearings, Judge Bright noted
that polygraph evidence remains a suspect form of evidence of
dubious probity. At trial, such evidence therefore requires the
building of a very careful evidentiary foundation-such as re-
quiring a qualified polygraph expert to testify and permitting
ample opportunity for the cross-examination of that expert.120
Judge Bright argued that the evidence adduced by the prosecu-
tor regarding Grajeda's polygraph examination had no founda-
tional support at all. Thus even under the lower threshold of
sentencing procedures, it "lacked any trustworthiness or reli-
ability whatsoever."12'
Judge Bright then turned to what he considered to be the
reason behind Grajeda's willingness to testify against his own
wife. He criticized the methods employed by the United States
Attorneys and their tendency to use strong-arm tactics, even in
cases in which family members are involved in a drug conspir-
acy. Judge Bright pointed out that prosecutors routinely turn
family members against one another, resulting in harm pri-
114. Romero, 128 F.3d at 1199 (Bright, J., dissenting).
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See Romero, 118 F.3d at 578.
119. See Romero, 128 F.3d at 1200 (Bright, J., dissenting).
120. See id. at 1199.
121. Id. at 1200.
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marily to the children of the family.122 Moreover, in this case,
Judge Bright noted that when Romero refused to submit to a
polygraph examination, the prosecutor sought to penalize her
by requesting a harsher sentence for obstruction of justice.123
Judge Bright observed that "[tlhe sad outcome of this case re-
sults from a sentencing structure which improperly confers
immense discretionary power upon the prosecutor."124 Judge
Bright further noted that, unfortunately, "prosecutors some-
times forget that the prosecutor's special duty is not to convict,
but to secure justice."125
Judge Bright concluded his dissent with a sweeping cri-
tique of the sentencing system for drug offenders:
In my view, sentencing in many federal drug cases is unworthy of
American justice, and it pains me that our citizens are often sen-
tenced to lengthy prison terms under circumstances similar to those
presented here. What is most disturbing, perhaps, is that this case is
not unusual in any significant respect from the seemingly endless
drug cases we review. It is precisely the ordinariness of the manner
in which we lock away Donna Romero for five years that appalls me.
In the end, it is simply another example of excessive mandatory sen-
tences, the use of improper evidence and the destruction of families
that results from this country's treatment of its non-violent drug of-
fenders. 26
The Observations of Robert W. Ferguson127
It was as ordinary a case as one ever finds as a law clerk
on the federal court of appeals. Three individuals pled guilty
to drug charges and were sentenced to lengthy prison terms.
None of the arguments raised by the defendants on appeal,
from a purely legal perspective, appeared particularly substan-
tive. As the law clerk assigned to this case, I saw nothing in
the record to recommend to Judge Bright anything other than
an affirmance.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting United States v. Guerra, 113 F.3d 809, 818 (8th Cir.
1997)).
126. Id. at 1200-01.
127. Robert W. Ferguson served as law clerk to the Honorable William
Fremming Nielsen, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Washington (1995-96) before serving as law clerk to Judge
Bright from 1996-97. He is a graduate of the New York University School of
Law and is now an Associate at Preston Gates & Ellis in Seattle, Washington.
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When my memorandum was complete, I dutifully dropped
it off on the Judge's desk, secure in the knowledge that I would
never see it again. I was mistaken. Later that morning, Judge
Bright stormed into my office, sat down, propped his feet on my
desk and said, "Let's talk about the Romero case."128 Romero,
one of the three defendants, was charged with transporting
drugs with her husband. She asserted that she knew they
were doing something illegal, but that she did not know pre-
cisely what was involved.
Because Romero was a first time, non-violent offender who
played a minor role in the crime, the Probation Office recom-
mended that she be considered for a sentence below the five-
year mandatory minimum, pursuant to the safety valve provi-
sion of the Sentencing Guidelines. The Assistant United
States Attorney prosecuting the case, however, felt differently.
The prosecutor utilized statements by Romero's husband that
she was an organizer of the crime to argue that Romero did not
meet the safety valve requirement that one testify truthfully to
one's involvement in the offense.
The prosecutor's tactics outraged Judge Bright. Pitting
family member against family member to increase an already
lengthy prison sentence for a first time, non-violent offender
was inexcusable to the Judge. Adding to his anger was the fact
that the prosecutor then "pursued a harsher sentence for ob-
struction of justice, as if a five-year sentence for this first of-
fender was somehow insufficient punishment." 129
It was not unusual for the Judge to reveal his emotions on
a case to his clerks. If a case upset him, you knew it. Usually,
however, this visceral response served as an opportunity to re-
lease his emotions and allow him to ultimately weigh the case
in a more subdued manner. For example, Judge Bright some-
times took pen in hand and hammered out a strongly worded
opinion, only to soften it considerably after a night's sleep.
More frequently, Judge Bright would ask me to draft an opin-
ion "and give them hell." When I later handed him such a
draft, he invariably deleted any language that was overly criti-
cal of another judge's legal reasoning. "Don't make it so per-
sonal. Remember, I've got to work with these guys." In this
128. Actually, Judge Bright used substantially more colorful language. For
purposes of these observations, the discussions I report will be a somewhat
sanitized version of our exchanges.
129. United States v. Romero, 118 F.3d 576, 584 (8th Cir. 1997) (Bright, J.,
dissenting).
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case, however, his frustration was directed at our country's
criminal justice system as well as the prosecutor, and it did not
subside.
The Judge decided to write a dissent and asked me to pro-
duce a draft. Before starting such work, I generally received a
verbal outline of the opinion from the Judge. I always enjoyed
these sessions, in part because they were liable to occur with-
out warning and in rather unexpected situations. It was not
unusual, for example, to receive instructions for an opinion in-
side the cleaners on Broadway while waiting for his shirts, be-
tween innings at a Fargo-Moorhead Red Hawks baseball game,
or in the middle of Lake Melissa on the Judge's boat while
spending a weekend at the Brights' summer cottage. Gener-
ally, however, these instructions took place in chambers with
the Judge leaning back in his chair, arms folded across his
chest, engaging in a legal stream of consciousness while I furi-
ously took notes. Among my notes from the Romero instruc-
tions there is one phrase, repeated by the Judge with his finger
jabbing at the air, that is in quotes and underlined twice:
"Unworthy of American Justice."
I rarely interrupted him during these monologues, in part
because it was impossible, and in part because it was an oppor-
tunity to sense the appropriate tone for the opinion. Further-
more, these sessions represented the unedited thinking of the
man, revealed the breadth of his intellect and offered insight
into his views of a particular case. His ability to accurately cite
cases and articles from memory was impressive and the Judge
often tossed out references to non-legal publications that he
wanted me to examine. Romero was no exception: "There's an
article a few years ago in the Atlantic Monthly about how our
drug sentencing is out of control and destroys families. Get
that and read it. If it's any good, quote it." Judge Bright con-
cluded his instructions by making it clear that he wanted a
strong dissent.
I drafted the dissent and quoted extensively from the At-
lantic Monthly article which was, not surprisingly, quite help-
ful. As always, however, I did not draft the dissent soon
enough for the Judge. He asked about my progress daily and
generally greeted me in the morning by shouting down the
hallway towards my office, "Where's that Romero dissent?"
The Judge maintained his keen interest in the case throughout
the writing of the dissent, constantly commenting on the injus-
tice of using the testimony of family members against one an-
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other.130 Benjamin Cardozo once wrote that "w]e are not to
close our eyes as judges to what we must perceive as men."131
Judge Bright never suffered from that judicial blindness and
always perceived the litigants not as an abstraction or princi-
ple of law, but as actual people wrestling with the difficulties of
life.
The filing of the Romero dissent and majority opinion did
not complete the saga of this case. Shortly thereafter, the
panel received a "Request For Modification Of Opinion Prior To
Final Publication" from the United States Attorney. The Re-
quest was highly unusual and contained a sharp critique of
Judge Bright's dissent. The Request asked, in no uncertain
terms, that Judge Bright dramatically revise his dissent.
By this time, I was nearing the end of my clerkship. I
thought I could accurately predict the Judge's reaction to the
Request and was confident he would commence tearing up the
Request with more than a few choice words when he read the
characterization of his dissent as "unfair." To my surprise, the
Judge walked into my office a few hours later with a few
handwritten changes to the dissent.
The Request then became the subject of animated discus-
sion between the Judge and myself, and I advised him to stand
by his dissent. Judge Bright, however, read the Request
calmly and viewed its criticisms with objectivity. In fact, he
agreed with one of the Request's arguments that his descrip-
tion of the prosecution as "overzealous" was not entirely appro-
priate because that word contained certain legal connotations
that did not accurately reflect his feelings regarding the prose-
cution in the matter. In the end, he submitted a slightly re-
vised dissent.
Despite his strong feelings regarding the federal sentenc-
ing guidelines and the Romero case, Judge Bright read the Re-
quest and recognized where it made a valid point. In so doing,
Judge Bright revealed a side of his judicial temperament that
130. The Romero case recently came to mind when the Special Prosecutor,
Kenneth Starr, subpoenaed the testimony of Monica Lewinsky's mother, Mar-
cia Lewis, regarding conversations with her daughter about a sexual relation-
ship with President Clinton. Numerous editorials around the country ex-
pressed shock that the government would force a mother to testify against her
own daughter. Judge Bright had the ability to see such injustice in a case in-
volving no publicity involving individuals somewhat less sympathetic than
Ms. Lewinsky and Mrs. Lewis.
131. People v. Knapp, 129 N.E. 202, 208 (1920).
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is rarely recognized. It would have been much easier to simply
stand by his original dissent, but Judge Bright chose a path
that required more reflection and humility. That lesson, appli-
cable beyond the confines of law, is the one that I treasure
most from my clerkship.
The Judge's fire for justice will not soon be extinguished.
The observations by his law clerks throughout this tribute are
testament to a span of decades in which the Judge continues to
see the extraordinary in the routine. The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit now has a more conservative orientation
than it did at the start of the Judge's judicial career. This
change requires the Judge to embrace, on occasion, the role of
dissenter. During my interview for the clerkship position, I
asked the Judge about his approach to drafting opinions. He
paused and said wryly, "we call them 'dissents' around here."
It is a role that requires the confidence to stand alone, armed
only with the courage of one's convictions. Indeed, Judge
Bright personifies the dissenter, "the gladiator making a last
stand against the lions,"132 in which:
[dleep conviction and warm feeling are saying their last say with
knowledge that the cause is lost. The voice of the majority may be
that of force triumphant, content with the plaudits of the hour, and
recking little of the morrow. The dissenter speaks to the future, and
his voice is pitched to a key that will carry through the years."3
When the day eventually comes to look back and view
Judge Myron Bright's contributions to the federal judiciary in
their entirety, his role as a dissenter on the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit may be recognized as his finest hour.
Neither his increasing years on the bench nor the shift in
alignment of the Eighth Circuit has altered the Judge's judicial
philosophy. I admired him anew each morning he came to
work, a gladiator nearing his eighties, shouting from his cham-
bers to my office, "Where's that Romero dissent?"
II. CASES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
The law of evidence plays a crucial role in all trials, both
criminal and civil, because it largely determines what informa-
tion is available for consideration by the appropriate trier of
fact. While much of this complex body of law remained con-
stant following the advent of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
132. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE 34 (1931).
133. Id. at 36.
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specialized area of law regarding the admission of expert tes-
timony has changed significantly. The revolution in the law of
expert testimony was initiated by the Supreme Court's 1993
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.13
4
In Daubert, the Supreme Court revamped the standards
governing the admissibility of scientific evidence in the federal
courts and rejected the seventy-year-old test from Frye v.
United States135- a test which had long been the gold standard
for novel scientific testimony. The Daubert decision is in some
ways quite narrow. Some courts have, for example, applied
Daubert only to purely scientific knowledge and not to techni-
cal or other specialized knowledge. 36 In other ways however,
Daubert greatly expands the potential range of admissible sci-
entific evidence and transfers broad discretion to trial judges.
No longer does such evidence need to have achieved "general
acceptance" in order to be introduced. Rather, Daubert applies
a flexible test and addresses the reliability of scientific knowl-
edge by reference to four factors: (1) whether the offered scien-
tific theory has been tested; (2) whether it has been subject to
peer review and publication; (3) whether there is a significant
known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether the theory of-
fered has achieved general acceptance in the scientific commu-
nity.13 7 No single factor is meant to be dispositive, and a care-
134. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
135. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Under the Frye test, federal courts ex-
cluded expert opinion based upon a scientific technique unless the technique
was sufficiently established to have gained "general acceptance" as reliable in
the particular scientific field to which it belonged. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at
584. The Supreme Court rejected the Frye test as incompatible with the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. See id. at 589.
136. See e.g. McKendall v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that the district court erred in excluding engineer's testimony
based on Daubert factors because Daubert applies only to testimony of scien-
tific knowledge, not to testimony based on training and experience); Car-
michael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. granted,
118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998) (finding that testimony based on experience falls out-
side the scope of Daubert, and that the district court erred as a matter of law
in applying Daubert to the testimony). But see Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus.,
Inc., 97 F.3d 293 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1552 (1997)
(concluding that expert testimony based on engineering principles was prop-
erly rejected under Daubert); Smelser v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 105 F.3d 299 (6th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 67 (1997) (concluding that the trial court
erred by not excluding, under Daubert, testimony by biomechanical engineer).
The Supreme Court is expected to resolve this circuit split in the Carmichael
case.
137. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
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ful analysis is to be conducted by the receiving court. The trial
judge is the "gatekeeper" and is charged with the responsibility
to ensure that all scientific evidence or testimony admitted is
both reliable and relevant.138
Many questions still remain unresolved under Daubert,
however, and Judge Bright is among the judges and legal
scholars looking for answers to the remaining questions re-
garding the admissibility of scientific evidence. He has lec-
tured and written widely on the important changes wrought by
Daubert, and several of his recent opinions have played a sig-
nificant role in the further refinement of expert testimony law.
Two of the most important-Robinson and Rouse-are dis-
cussed below.
A. ROBINSON V. MIssOuRI PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. 139
Computer technology has changed many areas of society,
and in recent years it has become an integral part of complex
litigation. For example, many attorneys use computer-
generated reenactments to dramatize their cases to juries.
Judge Bright authored the first published circuit court opinion
regarding the admissibility of video animation used to illus-
trate an expert's accident causation theory. In Robinson v.
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., Judge Bright, as a visiting judge
in the Tenth Circuit, utilized the Daubert factors in upholding
the district court's admission of video animation for demon-
strative purposes. 40
Julia Ann Turnbull and her infant son, Darwin, were
killed when a Missouri Pacific freight train hit her Chevrolet at
a gate-and-light-protected crossing in Oklahoma.1 41 The re-
spective personal representatives for the mother and the infant
("the Robinsons") brought wrongful death actions against Mis-
souri Pacific. The jury, after a five-day trial, awarded Darwin's
estate $250,000 and Julia Ann's estate $140,000 and found
Missouri Pacific 70% at fault and Julia Ann 30% at fault for
the accident.142 Missouri Pacific appealed, arguing that it was
entitled to judgments of dismissal as a matter of law and that
138. See id. at 597.
139. 16 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 1994).
140. Id. at 1088-89.
141. See id. at 1084.
142. See id. at 1085.
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the district court erred by not granting a new trial because of
errors at trial, principally involving evidentiary matters. 143
On October 31, 1989, Turnbull was driving westbound
when she collided with a southbound Missouri Pacific train.1 "
Turnbull, her infant son and three other passengers in her car
were killed.1 45 The car was found approximately 2000 feet
south of the crossing, a result of the train pushing it straight
down the track.146
The Robinsons asserted at trial that the gates had failed to
lower at the proper time and allowed Turnbull to enter the
crossing at the same time as the oncoming train. To support
this theory, the Robinsons argued that, because the train
pushed the car straight down the tracks, the train must have
struck the car at a perpendicular angle. 47 The Robinsons
called several witnesses to support this theory, including their
accident reconstructionist, A.O. Pipkin. Pipkin prepared a
video animation to illustrate his opinion that the train struck
the car at a perpendicular angle.148
Missouri Pacific, in contrast, argued that the train struck
the car at a 17 degree angle while Turnbull attempted to drive
around the lowered gates. 49 Missouri Pacific contended that a
sharp angle collision could have resulted in the car being found
south of the crossing if the train engine and the car were locked
together. 50 Missouri Pacific asserted that the crossing arms
and signal unit were working properly and that Turnbull neg-
143. Missouri Pacific argued on appeal that the district court erred in
failing to exclude the following evidence: (1) a video reenactment; (2) eyewit-
ness testimony about a near-miss at the same crossing, (3) plaintiffs signal
expert's opinion on the cause of the accident; and (4) testimony concerning
Missouri Pacific's internal policies. See id. at 1086. Missouri Pacific also ar-
gued that a juror should have been removed for cause and that the district
court erred in denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
See id. The court affirmed the district court on Missouri Pacific's appeal. The
Turnbulls cross-appealed, arguing that the district court erred in granting
Missouri Pacific's motion for contribution on Darwin's claim on grounds that
Oklahoma's doctrine of parental immunity barred contribution. The court af-
firmed the district court on the cross-appeal, rejecting this assertion. See id.
at 1085.
144, See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 1086.
150. See id. at 1085.
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ligently caused the collision. The jury heard witnesses sup-
porting Missouri Pacific's theory as well.151
On appeal, Missouri Pacific argued that the district court
erred by permitting the jury to view the videotape prepared by
Pipkin. Pipkin generated the video by creating a scale model of
the accident scene that included a train, a car, crossing gates,
structures and shrubs found in the vicinity of the accident.1 52
Pipkin then moved the model vehicles by hand with the train
at a scaled speed of 49 m.p.h. as testified to by an engineer
witness, and the car at a scaled speed of 13 m.p.h., a speed
randomly chosen by Pipkin153 The recreation resulted in a
"dramatic two-minute silent color video," depicting first the
Robinson's theory that the gate was up and then Missouri Pa-
cific's theory that the gate was down.154 The video demon-
strated that, in the gate up depiction, the train pushed the car
straight down the track. In the gate down depiction, however,
the video showed the car spinning off the tracks in a south-
westerly direction.1 55
Judge Bright determined that the first scenario easily fit
within the Tenth Circuit's precedent supporting the admission
of the animation as illustrative of the plaintiffs expert's theory
of the collision. 156 However, the second scenario's admission
created a more difficult issue. The second scenario showed
what might have happened if the car went around the gate and
the train struck the car at a sharp angle.157 The recreation ig-
nored the possibility, however, that the collision could have
"impaled the vehicle on the front plow of the train, making it
impossible for the vehicle to spin off the track."lS1
Missouri Pacific made a Rule 403159 objection to the second
scenario being shown to the jury, arguing that the scenario was
highly prejudicial.1 60 Judge Bright stated for the court that
"[given the limited, solely illustrative purpose for introducing
151. See id. at 1086.
152. See id.
153. See id. Pipkin opined that the Chevrolet could not have been travel-
ing more than 20 m.p.h. See id.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 1087 (citing Brandt v. French, 638 F.2d 209, 212 (10th Cir.
1981) and Gilbert v. Cosco, Inc., 989 F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1993)).
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. FED. R. EVID. 403.
160. See Robinson, 16 F.3d at 1087-88.
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the exhibit, the cautionary instruction to the jury, and the op-
portunity for vigorous cross-examination, we do not believe the
district court abused its discretion in admitting the second sce-
nario."161 Furthermore, Judge Bright noted that any prejudice
was, under the circumstances, lessened by testimony from a
defense expert that, regardless of the angle of the collision, the
train and car would have locked together. 162 The verdict appor-
tioning 30% of the fault to Turnbull also demonstrated that the
jury did not completely agree that the animated scenes repre-
sented a true and complete recreation of the collision.163
Judge Bright then discussed the recreation in the context
of the Daubert decision. The opinion concluded that the
Daubert standard should be applied to demonstrative scientific
evidence and that this evidence fits the flexible standard enun-
ciated in Daubert164 Judge Bright advised trial judges to re-
view videos outside the presence of the jury and "carefully and
meticulously [to] examine proposed animation evidence for
proper foundation, relevancy and the potential for undue
prejudice."165 The crash recreation fit under the Daubert
analysis because the "physical phenomena of crash movements
may be explained on scientific principles," but the opinion did
note that an argument could be made that the given testimony
rested outside established scientific knowledge. 66  Under
Daubert, the trial judge, as "gatekeeper," should make an
evaluation before the trial on the admissibility of film or ani-
mation illustrative of scientific expert opinions.167
16L Id. at 1088.
162, See id.
163. See id.
164 See id. at 1088-89.
165. Id. at 1088.
166. Id. at 1089.
167. See id. The opinion also mentioned that many objections could be
made to exclude computer simulations and animations. See id. at n.7. In ad-
dition to lack of relevancy or reliability, attorneys could also object on the ba-
sis of lack of authentication, FED. R. EVID. 901(a), hearsay or lack of founda-
tion, FED. R. EVID. 801, and undue prejudice as an attempted reenactment,
FED. R. EVID. 403. See Robinson, 16 F.3d at 1089; see also MYRON H. BRIGHT
& RONALD L. CARLSON, OBJEcTIONS AT TRIAL 45-49 (2d ed. 1993).
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The Observations of Daniel Shacknai168
I had the privilege to serve as a law clerk for the Honor-
able Myron H. Bright as he grappled with the difficult eviden-
tiary issues presented to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Robinson v. Missouri Pacific.
Even though Mr. Pipkin's brief animated video appears
somewhat primitive by today's MTV-influenced standards-it
featured neither sound nor particularly slick editing-the video
nevertheless presented dramatic images of the disparate crash
theories advanced by the parties. The principal problem we
confronted in reviewing the district court's findings was the ex-
tent to which the video (and in particular, the second, "gates
down" scenario) unfairly prejudiced the jury toward accepting
Pipkin's theory of causation. Another problem concerned
whether Pipkin had an adequate scientific foundation for his
opinion, depicted by the video's second scenario, that a train
striking a car at an angle consistent with driving around low-
ered crossing gates would necessarily cause the car to spin off
the tracks in a southwesterly direction.
Judge Bright ultimately resolved these questions by
drawing on his vast experience as both judge and litigator. 69
After giving painstaking consideration to the Supreme Court's
then-recent decision in Daubert, Judge Bright focused our re-
view on several aspects of the trial that appeared to minimize
whatever prejudice the video demonstration might have cre-
ated. First, Pipkin offered the video solely for illustrative pur-
poses. Whatever the video's effect, it did nothing more than
depict graphically what the expert explained in words. Second,
the jury received a cautionary instruction from the trial judge
advising the jury that the video did not constitute a recreation
of the accident. Third, defendants had ample opportunity to
undermine Pipkin's opinion through cross-examination.
Fourth, the defendants were entitled to present, and did pres-
ent, their own expert whose opinion clashed with Pipkin's.
Judge Bright also found it significant that the jury apportioned
168. Daniel Shacknai served as a law clerk for Judge Bright from 1993 to
1994. He is a graduate of Cornell Law School and currently practices as an
Associate General Counsel for the Administration for Children's Services for
the City of New York.
169. During lunches with his clerks at the Fargo Radisson or Elks Club,
Judge Bright would frequently share stories from his 20 years as a trial law-
yer. He also enjoyed telling "war stories" after tennis matches with one par-
ticular clerk, even if the outcome of those matches was not to his liking.
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fault between the railroad and the car's driver. The 70-30 allo-
cation of responsibility for the crash suggested, at a minimum,
that the video did not wholly blind the jury to the expert and
eyewitness testimony introduced by defendants.
In formulating the Robinson opinion, Judge Bright sought
to provide guidance to both judges and trial lawyers on the ap-
plication of Daubert to video "reenactments." Robinson sug-
gests that to fulfill the gatekeeper function outlined in
Daubert, trial judges should attempt to evaluate the admissi-
bility of proffered video or film evidence outside the jury's pres-
ence. Further, courts should evaluate questions of admissibil-
ity within the context of the trial as a whole, taking into
account the effect of cautionary instructions, objections by the
party opposing admissibility, cross-examination of the witness
offering the visual evidence, and the opportunity of the oppos-
ing party to present their own experts and illustrative materi-
als.
While the key issues in Robinson involved attempts to de-
pict the past, the decision also has a strong forward-looking
dimension. The Tenth Circuit's unanimous ruling based on
Judge Bright's opinion anticipates difficult evidentiary ques-
tions emerging more frequently as litigants harness the power
of the moving image through rapidly advancing computer ani-
mation technology.
B. UNITED STATES V. RoUSE170
In the Rouse opinions, Judge Bright again played a role in
the development of meaningful scientific evidence case law
with his argument that the Daubert decision applies to soft sci-
ence. Desmond Rouse, Jesse Rouse, Garfield Feather, and
Russell Hubbeling appealed convictions for aggravated sexual
abuse of young children on the Yankton Sioux Indian Reserva-
tion.171  They had each received sentences of over thirty
years. 172 A divided panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, with Judge Bright serving as the author of the majority
opinion, reversed the convictions and remanded the case for a
170. United States v. Rouse, 111 F.3d 561 (8th Cir. 1997), rev'g 100 F.3d
560 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 261 (1997).
171. See id. at 565.
172. The defendants-and a fifth defendant, Duane Rouse, who was later
acquitted by the jury-were charged with twenty-three counts of aggravated
sexual abuse of children under age twelve in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c).
See Rouse, 100 F.3d at 561.
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new trial. The court held that the trial court erred in excluding
expert opinion testimony that the child complainants had been
subjected to a practice of suggestibility."3 A divided majority
on rehearing decided that any error in the exclusion of the ex-
pert testimony was harmless and affirmed the convictions. 74
In both opinions, the admissibility of the expert testimony re-
garding soft science was evaluated under the Daubert stan-
dard.
In the original opinion, Judge Bright stated that the con-
troversy in the case revolved around whether an expert in child
behavior studies could testify to the following question (made
by offer of proof):
Q. And based on your review of [the trial testimony] and your review
of the records, all the files in this matter, is it your belief that there's
been a practice of suggestibility employed in these techniques?
A. Yes, sir.17s
The prosecutors did not challenge Dr. Ralph Charles Under-
wager's expertise. He was an accomplished clinical psycholo-
gist who had been practicing or teaching in the profession for
about twenty years.176 Instead, the prosecutors challenged the
substance of the offer.177 The district court agreed with the
prosecutors' objection and rejected the offer, concluding that it
was not the proper subject of expert testimony and not reliable
or relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) and confus-
ing and misleading to the jury under Federal Rule of Evidence
403.179 The district court concluded that the proposed testi-
mony was not the type of expert testimony contemplated by
Daubert.179 Judge Bright disagreed.
According to Judge Bright, the Daubert standard ensures
the reliability and relevance of scientific testimony and evi-
dence. 80 One of the issues in Rouse was whether the testimony
offered by Dr. Underwager was scientific knowledge. Judge
173. See Rouse, 100 F.3d at 578.
17{ See Rouse, 111 F.3d at 574 (Bright, J., dissenting). In the original
opinion, the court held that the district court erred in denying the defendants'
motion for an independent psychological examination of the children. In his
dissent on rehearing, Judge Bright stood by this ruling but recognized that
this error alone would not justify a new trial. See id. at 574 n.13.
175. Rouse, 100 F.3d at 566.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 566-67.
179. See id. at 569.
180. See id. at 567.
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Bright noted that Daubert may not apply to certain social sci-
ence evidence before evaluating the soft science at issue.18' In
this case, Judge Bright concluded that the district court had
misapplied Daubert. He reasoned:
The defense fulfilled the requirements of Daubert. The witness did
not purport to testify that witnesses had in fact succumbed to any
suggestive aspects of the investigation; only that the investigative
means in this case were consistent with the psychological studies
that similar techniques operated suggestively on young children. In
addition, every condition which Dr. Underwager attempted to testify
to as creating a practice of suggestibility has been amply demon-
strated in the psychological literature as producing undue suggesti-
bility in children's testimony. The importance and relevance is ap-
parent.lu
After reviewing the evidence and literature, Judge Bright
concluded that support existed for the defendants' offer of
proof. Dr. Underwager, after reviewing files, records, and tes-
timony in the case, concluded that the child complainants had
been subjected to "a practice of suggestibility" in the inter-
views, making them susceptible to faulty memory.183 Support
for this conclusion included, in particular, a recent scientific
article presented to the district court indicating that many of
the techniques used in the interviews with the small child
complainants were likely to produce biased, untrue or false
memories.184 Furthermore, Judge Bright found that Eighth
Circuit case law supported the admission because the testi-
mony was similar to "a qualified expert opining that an abuse
victim's symptoms are consistent with sexual abuse syndrome,
battered woman syndrome, battered child syndrome and other
recognized syndromes. "185
Upon rehearing, the panel reversed itself and affirmed the
district court. 8 6 In his dissent to this decision, Judge Bright
incorporated the analysis from his former majority opinion and
further argued that the error of excluding the expert testimony
181. See id. at 567-68.
182. Id. at 569.
183. See id. at 568.
184. See id. at 569 (citing Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, Suggestibility
of the Child Witness: A Historical Review and Synthesis, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL.
403-39 (1993)).
185. Id. at 573. See, e.g., United States v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir.
1994); United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Simpson, 979 F.2d 1282, 1287-88 (8th Cir. 1992).
186. See United States v. Rouse, 111 F.3d 561, 565 (8th Cir. 1997).
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of Dr. Underwager was far from harmless error. 87 The major-
ity opinion stated that the error constituted harmless error be-
cause the jury heard about Dr. Underwager's theory of faulty
memory and that trial testimony corresponded with the chil-
dren's "free recall."188 Judge Bright responded that he did not
find such "free recall" in the record due to adult influence in all
of the early statements made by the children.189 In addition,
the jury would not recognize coercive influences used by the in-
vestigators and the effect of lengthy questioning on young chil-
dren testifying truthfully. 190 Furthermore, the record showed
evidence of prejudice by one or more jurors against Native
Americans, a fact which made the exclusion of the evidence
even more problematic; the disallowed evidence might have ef-
fectively overcome such juror bias.191
The Observations of Cathleen M. Mogan192
Judge Bright worked very hard on the Rouse case. From
the beginning, both he and I were deeply disturbed by the vo-
luminous factual record. Originally, one child was taken from
home based on possible neglect by a grandparent. After
spending several months in a foster home, the foster parent re-
ported that the child had suggested sexual abuse, and a thera-
pist interviewed the child. On the strength of that interview
alone and without further investigation, the state agency re-
moved approximately thirteen children from two homes the
next day. According to evidence, squad cars pulled up and the
children were physically removed while they cried and clung to
their uncles' and other adults' legs. The children were told
that they could not go home until they told the "truth" about
their uncles. Indeed, they did not see their mothers and fami-
lies again for over six months. The record showed that social
workers who interviewed the children broke just about every
rule in suggestive interviewing. Some of the stories eventually
told by the children were fantastical at best. Approximately
nine of the thirteen children adamantly and consistently de-
187. See id. at 579-80 (Bright, J., dissenting).
188. See id. at 572 (majority opinion).
189. See id. at 579 (Bright, J., dissenting).
190. See id.
19L See id. at 580.
192. Cathleen M. Mogan served as law clerk to Judge Bright in 1995-96.
She is a graduate of Notre Dame Law School and is now a lawyer with Legal
Aid of Western Missouri.
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nied being abused and most of the family and many members
of the community who testified did not believe the children
were abused. The pediatrician who originally examined the
children found no evidence of sexual abuse. There were many
other troubling aspects of the case, as noted in Judge Bright's
original majority opinion.
Against this backdrop, Judge Bright evaluated the ques-
tion of whether an expert should have been allowed to testify
about the suggestive effects of interviewing a child witness. He
was concerned primarily with the prejudicial effect of not edu-
cating the jury. The expert was not simply prohibited at trial
from opining on the credibility of the witnesses, but also from
testifying about whether the interviewing and investigative
techniques employed in the case were similar to techniques
employed in psychological studies which had been shown to op-
erate suggestively on young children. To decide the case,
Judge Bright delved deeply into the literature (as he often
does) and became well-educated on the subject of suggestive in-
terviewing.
In the end, Judge Bright concluded that the jury needed,
and was entitled, to hear the evidence to evaluate whether the
sexual abuse to which the children testified actually occurred.
He found the expert's testimony to be relevant, proper, sup-
ported by Eighth Circuit precedent, and crucial to the defense
under the circumstances of the case. In doing so, he explored
the history and implications of Daubert, a topic dear to his
heart. As always, in working with Judge Bright, his enthusi-
asm and intelligence energized the process and I feel confident
that his involvement in the case gave it the best illumination
possible.
HI. CASES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW
The 1950s and 1960s rallied in significant social change in
America. Among the most important and meaningful evolu-
tions was the movement toward racial equality. 93 The move-
ment was fought along many fronts and affected all sectors of
daly life, including education, housing, voting rights, and em-
193. For a detailed discussion of the Civil Rights Era, see T. BROOKS,
WALLS COME TUMBLING DOWN: A HISTORY OF THE CIvIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT,
1940-1970 (1974) and A. MEIER & E. RUDWICK, C.O.R.E., A STUDY OF THE
CIV RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1942-1968 (1973).
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ployment. The legal centerpiece of this great national effort
was the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 194-which in-
cluded the famous anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII.195
The federal courts have, of course, played an instrumental
role in the implementation of Title VII, through the interpreta-
tion and enforcement of its various provisions. Judge Bright
came to the bench in 1968, a time in which many of the funda-
mental points of Title VII had yet to be interpreted and re-
solved. In the years that followed, Judge Bright heard numer-
ous cases in this area of prolific litigation and authored
opinions attempting to ensure that the legislative intent be-
hind Title VII was carried out.196  His two most important
opinions in this area, both landmarks in the field of employ-
ment discrimination law, are Parham v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co.197 and Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.198 The
former remains important because it holds that statistics may
speak louder than words when assessing possible racial dis-
crimination in the employment practices of a company. The
latter, affirmed in part by the Supreme Court in 1973,199 is of
profound historical importance in the area of employment law.
194. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
195. Section 703(a) of Title VII provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or oth-
erwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
196. The legislative purpose behind Title VII was described by the Su-
preme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain
from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of em-
ployment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in
the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees....
... What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbi-
trary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers op-
erate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other im-
permissible classification.
401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971).
197. 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
198. 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972).
199. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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It articulates, for the first time, the necessary elements of a
prima facie case of race discrimination under Title VII and ex-
plains why it is necessary to shift the burden of proof to em-
ployers once a prima facie case has been established.
A. PARHAM V. SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE Co.
In February of 1967, Arthur Ray Parham, an eighteen-
year-old black male, applied for a position as a stockman with
the Little Rock, Arkansas office of Southwestern Bell Tele-
phone Company.200 At the time, there were no vacancies for
stockmen at the Little Rock office, but there were positions
available for linemen.20 Parham indicated an interest in fill-
ing a lineman position, and his application was processed ac-
cordingly. He was interviewed and passed certain standard-
ized tests.20 2 Following an additional interview, Parham was
scheduled for a physical examination. Before his examination,
however, Southwestern Bell advised him that they would not
offer him employment because, after considering his school and
prior work records, the company had concluded he lacked "the
qualifications needed for employment."20 3
Parham filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) in April of 1967, charging
Southwestern Bell with unlawful racial discrimination in its
hiring policies.204 Following investigation, the EEOC found
that there was reasonable cause to believe that the defendant
was guilty of a discriminatory employment practice, 20 5 and ini-
tiated conciliation proceedings in an attempt to resolve the
dispute.206 In November of 1967, Southwestern Bell offered
200. See Parham, 433 F.2d at 422.
201. See Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., No. LR-68-C-81, 1969 WL
109, at *2 (E.D. Ark. July 8, 1969).
202. See id.
203. See Parham, 433 F.2d at 423.
204. See id.
205. See id. The EEOC's findings, issued in September of 1967, stated:
Reasonable cause exists to believe that [Southwestern Bell] is in vio-
lation of Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
by not hiring [Parham], a Negro, solely because of a poor reference
that was not really indicative of his potential at a Company job, al-
though he fulfilled all other requirements for employment; and in ad-
dition, no Negro males are employed by [Southwestern Bell] except
as service workers.
Id. at 423 n.2.
206. See id. at 423. The conciliation proceedings were initiated pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a). See Parham, 433 F.2d at 423.
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Parham a lineman position, which he declined because he was
then enrolled in college.207 Southwestern Bell then refused to
enter into a conciliatory agreement with the EEOC, arguing
that Parham's refusal of employment rendered the dispute
moot, because there was nothing left to conciliate. 208
Parham filed suit in federal court in April of 1968.209 At
trial, the district court was presented with two issues. The
first issue was whether Parham had suffered any unlawful dis-
crimination at the hands of the defendant.' The second,
broader issue was whether Southwestern Bell discriminated in
general against blacks as a class in its Arkansas operation.
The district court first placed the burden of proving unlaw-
ful discrimination, by a preponderance of the evidence, on the
plaintiff. The district court went on to say that although dis-
crimination may be inferred by an employer's hiring practices
over time in a given area, due consideration must also be given
to the number of people in the group allegedly discriminated
against who want to work for the employer and are qualified to
do so. 210
The district court held that Southwestern Bell had not dis-
criminated against blacks as a class, because it found "nothing
discriminatory or unusual"2 1 about the company's hiring pro-
cedures. The company had revised its hiring policies and is-
sued a non-discrimination statement when the Civil Rights Act
was enacted in 1964, and the court accepted the sincerity of
that statement at face value.212 The court, after considering
Southwestern Bell's employment statistics, concluded that the
Company, in its hiring of employees may have had "a disincli-
nation.., to employ Negroes, and to that extent the situation
was probably discriminatory."213 However, the court went on to
describe other non-discriminatory reasons that might explain
207. See Parham, 433 F.2d at 423. Parham had become interested in
church and social work, and had spent the summer of 1967 working in Alaska
with school aged children. In the fall, he had returned to Little Rock and en-
rolled in Philander Smith College where he studied for the ministry. See
Parham, 1969 WL 109, at *2.
208. Parham, 1969 WL 109, at *2.
209. See id.
210. See id. at *4.
211. Id. at *5.
212. See id. at *5-*6. The court did note, however, that "it was not vigor-
ously implemented for a time and did not itself produce any significant in-
crease in the number of Negroes employed by the company." Id at *6.
213. Id.
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Southwestern Bell's dearth of minority employees-such as "a
shortage of qualified Negro applicants"214 and "inbred" hiring
practices, in which friends or relatives of existing employees
were recruited.
The district court noted that after 1966, Southwestern Bell
began to actively recruit minority applicants, and that while
there was "still a great disparity" in the number of non-white
employees, it could not be "remedied overnight or within a
short time by the company regardless of its good will and ef-
forts in that direction."215 The district court held that it was
not necessary or appropriate to issue an injunction against
Southwestern Bell because of measures the company had al-
ready taken and proposed to take in the future to provide
blacks with equal opportunities in employment.216 The district
court further held that Southwestern Bell had not discrimi-
nated against Parham individually because poor references
from the Arkansas Baptist Hospital, a former employer, pro-
vided a reasonable, independent, and non-racial basis for re-
fusing to hire him.217 It noted that "the fact that an individual
Negro is not employed by an employer does not necessarily
show any racial discrimination."218
When that result was appealed, Judge Bright wrote the
opinion for the Eighth Circuit panel that heard the case. He
upheld the district court's decision in part, holding that insuffi-
cient evidence existed to show that Southwestern Bell had dis-
criminated against Parham individually.219 He nevertheless
214. Id.
215. Id. at *8.
216. See id. at *10.
217. See id. at *11-'12. Parham argued that his poor reference from the
Arkansas Baptist Hospital was unreliable because he believed his discharge
had racial overtones as well. See id. at *9. The EEOC agreed with Parham's
argument. See id. at *11.
218. Id. at *8.
219. See Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 428 (8th Cir.
1970). The court recognized that "Parham's failure to establish his claim for
individual damages will not bar relief for the class he represents. The very
nature of a Title VII violation rests upon discrimination against a class char-
acteristic, i.e., race, religion, sex or national origin." Id. (citation omitted).
Although the court upheld the district court's determination that an in-
junction was no longer warranted, the court awarded Parham reasonable at-
torney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The court recognized that
"Parham's lawsuit acted as a catalyst which prompted the appellee to take
action implementing its own fair employment policies and seeking compliance
with the requirements of Title VII. In this sense, Parham performed a valu-
able public service in bringing this action." Parham, 433 F.2d at 429-30.
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reversed the district court insofar as it dealt with the charge of
discrimination against blacks as a class. Reiterating the em-
ployment statistics Parham had introduced at trial, he noted
that "[n]either the announcement of the Company's equal em-
ployment-opportunity policy nor the enactment of Title VII
served to produce any noticeable increase in the number of
blacks employed from April, 1964, to December 31, 1966."220 In
addressing the class-based discrimination charge, Judge
Bright wrote that "statistics often tell much and Courts listen.'
The statistical evidence introduced by Parham clearly demon-
strated the Company's discriminatory employment practices
from July 2, 1965, until February, 1967, notwithstanding its
previously-announced policy of equal employment opportuni-
ties. 221
The Court of Appeals went on to hold that the statistics,
which indicated that the Company hired and employed only a
few black employees other than those employed as menial la-
borers, established as a matter of law that Southwestern Bell
was engaging in racially discriminatory employment practices
in violation of Title VHI.222 The court also noted that changes
made by the company in its employment practices following the
suit, including its offer of employment to Parham and its
stepped-up minority recruitment efforts, did not absolve the
company of its previous racial discrimination against blacks as
a class. 223 In Judge Bright's view, "[w]hile an employer's more
recent employment practices may bear upon the remedy
sought, they do not affect the determination of whether the
employer previously violated Title VII."224
220. Parham, 433 F.2d at 424. The court observed that while the company
had hired only three more blacks, it had increased its work force by over 400.
See id.
22L Id. at 426 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Alabama v. United
States, 304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1962), affd per curiam, 371 U.S. 37 (1962)).
222. See id. The court also found that Southwestern Bell's referral proc-
ess, which had relied primarily on referrals from existing employees, operated
to discriminate against blacks as a class, because "existing white employees
tended to recommend their own relatives, friends, and neighbors, who would
likely be of the same race." Id. at 426-27.
223. See id. at 426.
224. Id.
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The Observations of James A Gallagher225
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company is
among the Title VII cases most frequently cited by courts and
commentators. 226 The Parham decision, authored by Judge
Bright in the late summer and early fall of 1970, and the key
legal principles articulated in the decision, while occasionally
criticized and often distinguished, generally have continuing
legal significance.
The factual and legal context of the Parham case pre-
sented the court with serious difficulties for several reasons.
First, the panel that heard the case was a sympathetic pro-
Title VII audience. More significant, however, was the fact
that the Arkansas federal district judge who heard the case
rejected Parham's individual claim of discrimination as a mat-
ter of fact. The lower court accepted the defendant's testimony
that it had conducted a good faith investigation of Parham's
background and rejected his application on that basis instead
of on the basis of his race. Based on the record in this regard,
the Court of Appeals could not reject these findings as unsup-
ported by the evidence or clearly erroneous.227 Like its testi-
mony with regard to Parham, the defendant had explanations,
again credited by the district court, for its refusal to hire every
other witness who testified at trial.228
Thus, in order to reverse the lower court, the Court of Ap-
peals was required to deal with the discrimination issues on a
close basis and as a matter of law. It did so in several respects.
First, it accepted simple statistics as to the extremely small
percentage of minorities in the work place, and most of those in
menial positions, to establish past discrimination as a matter
of law.229 Second, the court held that a recruitment system
predicated upon recommendations of an overwhelmingly white
225. James A. Gallagher served as law clerk to Judge Bright during the
1969-70 term. He is a graduate of the University of Minnesota Law School
and has recently retired from the law firm of Maun & Simon in St. Paul, Min-
nesota.
226. The decision has been cited on more than 430 occasions, including
several times by the United States Supreme Court, and by more than 60
commentators. Westlaw search on Sept. 21, 1998.
227. See Parham, 433 F.2d at 428.
228. See id. at 425.
229. See id. at 426. The use of statistics has ebbed and flowed over the
years and far more sophisticated statistical evidence is now presented in dis-
parate treatment and disparate impact cases than was before the court in
Parham.
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workforce was discriminatory as a matter of law.230 Third, by
focusing upon the time of the rejection of Parham's application
and his EEOC complaint, the Court of Appeals could overcome
the lower court's finding that the defendant was not "now dis-
criminating against Negroes as a class,"231 while still recog-
nizing the "impressive and salutory" steps the defendant had
taken subsequent to institution of the action.232 Fourth, the
court held as a matter of law that the failure of an individual
claim did not preclude granting relief to the class subject to
discrimination.233 Fifth, even though the lower court denied
injunctive relief, and the Court of Appeals afflrmed that deci-
sion, because of past discrimination, the Court of Appeals re-
manded "to insure the continued implementation of the appel-
lee's policy of equal employment opportunities."234 In essence,
Judge Bright recognized that each of these legal conclusions
was required in order to "carry out the purpose of Congress to
eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness and humiliation of ra-
cial discrimination."235
With regard to attorney fees, the court was presented with
a pragmatic dilemma. Parham's individual case had failed,
based on the trial court's findings, and a refusal to award fees
based on the class action allegation would have discouraged
private plaintiffs from instituting actions. The second impor-
tant factor was that all Southwestern Bell had accomplished
prior to institution of the action by Parham was the adoption of
a nondiscrimination policy. After the EEOC complaint was
filed, however, the defendant began taking affirmative steps,
including offering Parham employment.236 The court refused to
recognize, as the district court had, that such action could alter
the fact that prior discrimination had occurred. 237 The court
assumed, based on the sequence of events, that Parham's ac-
tions served as a "catalyst" which prompted Southwestern Bell
to take action to implement its self-pronounced fair employ-
230. See id. at 427.
231. Id. at 425.
232. Id. at 429.
233. See id. at 428.
234. Id. at 429.
235. Id. at 425.
236. See id. at 426.
237. See id.
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ment policies and the requisite public service entitled him to
an award of reasonable attorney fees.23 8
Parham generally represents Judge Bright's judicial phi-
losophy, namely his belief that the courts exist to redress
grievances and to insure compliance with both the letter and
the spirit of the law. It also reflects his passion to protect indi-
vidual rights and to insure that fairness is achieved in the
workplace. The most often quoted refrain during the summer
of 1970 in the second floor chambers above a clothing store in
Fargo, North Dakota (one which did not find its way into the
Parham opinion due to the exercise of judicial restraint) is that
"figures don't lie, but liars figure." Acceptance of that premise
served as the foundation for the opinion.
B. GREEN V. MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORP.
By the early 1970s, the legislative work had been done.
Title VII was in full effect, but a crucial issue remained unre-
solved: what would be the test for determining discrimination
in employment? That question came before the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1972. The decision in Green v. McDonnell
Douglas239 was to influence the path of discrimination litigation
in this country. The Supreme Court's decision to affirm240
would ultimately prove to be the leading case in the field.
Adopting much of Judge Bright's reasoning, the Court articu-
lated both the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination
and explained the shifting burden of proof in such cases.241 As
evidence of the case's unique importance, it may be noted that
as of September 1998, over 8100 cases have cited McDonnell
Douglas v. Green for its holding establishing the shifting bur-
dens of proof in discrimination cases.242
Percy Green, the plaintiff, was a black man who had
worked for McDonnell Douglas as a mechanic, beginning in
1956.243 In 1964, the company laid off several employees, in-
cluding Green, during a general reduction in the company's
workforce. 2" Green, who had been active in the civil rights
238. Id. at 429-30.
239. 463 F.2d 337, 339 (8th Cir. 1972).
240. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
241. See id. at 802-03; see also BARBARA LINDEiAN & PAUL GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIIHNATION LAw 11-16 (3d ed. 1996).
242. Westlaw search on Sept. 15, 1998.
243. See Green, 463 F.2d at 339.
244. See id.
2891998]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
movement for years, protested his layoff as racially motivated.
He filed formal discrimination complaints, 245 and participated
in protests sponsored by civil rights organizations. The protests
were designed to draw attention to McDonnell Douglas's alleg-
edly discriminatory employment practices. The first protest
was a "stall-in" where cars were parked on the roads leading to
McDonnell Douglas, completely blocking access to the com-
pany. The second protest was a "lock-in," where chains and a
lock were placed on the front door of the company to prevent
McDonnell Douglas employees from leaving.
About three weeks after the lock-in, McDonnell Douglas
advertised for qualified mechanics. Green applied for re-
employment, but the company rejected his application, stating
that its reasons for rejection were based on his participation in
the illegal "stall-in" and "lock-in."246 Green then filed a formal
complaint with the EEOC, alleging that McDonnell Douglas
had refused to rehire him because of his race and his continu-
ing involvement with the civil rights movement.247 The EEOC
did not make a finding regarding McDonnell Douglas's alleged
racial discrimination, but it did find reasonable cause to be-
lieve that the company had violated §704(a) by refusing to re-
hire Green due to his civil rights activities.248 The EEOC was
unable to successfully conciliate the dispute and advised
Green, in March of 1968, of his right to institute a civil action
in federal court.249
Green commenced the action in federal district court in
April of 1968, alleging that McDonnell Douglas had discrimi-
245. See id. Green filed complaints with the President's Commission on
Civil Rights, the Justice Department, the Department of the Navy, the De-
fense Department, and the Missouri Commission on Human Rights. See id.
246. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 796. In fact, throughout the en-
suing litigation, McDonnell Douglas never disputed Green's technical ability
to perform the work required of the position. See id. at 802.
247. See id. at 796. Specifically, Green alleged that McDonnell Douglas
had violated sections 703(a)(1) and 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-3(a). See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
796. See supra note 195 for the relevant text of § 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Section 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to dis-
criminate against any of his employees or applicants for employ-
ment... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful em-
ployment practice by this subchapter.
248. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 797.
249. See id.
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nated against him by denying him employment because of his
participation in civil rights activities and "because of his race
and color."250 The district court struck the latter allegation
upon a motion by McDonnell Douglas.251 The district court
reasoned that it lacked jurisdiction because the EEOC had not
made a finding as to the reasonable cause of this claim.252
After a trial on the remaining allegations, the district
court determined that the "controlling and ultimate fact ques-
tions [were] (1) whether [Green's] misconduct is sufficient to
justify [McDonnell Douglas's] refusal to rehire, and (2) whether
the 'stall in' and the 'lock in' are the real reasons for defen-
dant's refusal to rehire the plaintiff."25 3 The district court an-
swered both questions affirmatively, noting that it was "clear
from the record that [McDonnell Douglas's] reasons for refus-
ing to rehire [Green] were motivated solely and simply by
[Green's] participation" in the protests against the company.254
The district court then placed the "burden of proving other rea-
sons" on the plaintiff and concluded that Green had not met
that burden.255
On appeal, Green raised three contentions. First, he ar-
gued that the lower court erred by dismissing his section 1981
claim arising from his layoff.256 Second, Green argued that the
250. Green, 463 F.2d at 339.
251. See id.
252. See Green v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 299 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (E.D.
Mo. 1969).
253. Green v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846, 850 (E.D. Mo.
1969).
254. Id. The district court stated that the evidence presented to the court
failed to establish by a preponderance that McDonnell Douglas had refused to
rehire Green because of racial prejudice or because of Green's "legitimate"
civil rights activity. See id. The district court drew a distinction between
what it considered lawful and unlawful activities. Since neither the "stall in"
nor the "lock in" were lawful forms of civil rights activities, the district court
determined they were not protected by Title VII. See id. at 851.
255. Id. at 850. The district court made the following findings and conclu-
sions, dismissing Green's complaint with prejudice:
(a) Plaintiff has not shown that defendant was motivated by racial
prejudice or because of plaintiffs legitimate civil rights activities.
(b) Plaintiffs layoff claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is barred by the
statute of limitations. (c) The Civil Rights Act does not protect activ-
ity which blocks entrances into or from an employer's plant or office.
(d) Defendant's refusal to reemploy plaintiff was based on plaintiffs
misconduct, which justified the refusal to rehire.
Id. at 851.
256. See Green, 463 F.2d at 340.
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trial court erred when it determined that his participation in
the stall-in and lock-in protests were not protected by Title
VII.257 Third, Green contended that the district court erred
when it struck the portion of his complaint alleging that
McDonnell Douglas had denied him re-employment for racially
discriminatory reasons.2 58
Judge Bright wrote the opinion for the majority, affirming
that Green's claim arising from his layoff claim under section
1981 was barred by the statute of limitations.2 59 The court also
upheld the district court's determination that Green's partici-
pation in the "stall-in" and "lock-in" were illegal activities not
protected by Title VII.260 However, the court held that the dis-
trict court erred when it struck the allegations of race-based
employment discrimination from Green's complaint. Judge
Bright wrote:
[A] complaining party need satisfy only two jurisdictional prerequi-
sites in order to bring suit against an employer under Title VII: first,
he must file a complaint with the EEOC; and second, he must receive
the statutory notice of the right to sue.... [Ain EEOC finding of rea-
sonable cause is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit.26'
Thus, the court held that Green was entitled to judicial re-
view on all of the forms of employment discrimination alleged
in his complaint to the EEOC.262 Judge Bright further noted
that it was possible that Green's application for employment
may have been protected by section 200Oe-2(a)(1) despite his
participation in activities the court had determined were not
protected by section 2000e-3(a).2 63 The court reasoned that sec-
tion 2000e-3(a) was peripheral to Title VII, and was intended
to shield employees from employer retaliation. Section 2000e-
2(a)(1), in contrast, "expresses Title VII's primary promise-
equal employment opportunities for all."264 Thus, the court
concluded:
257. See id.
258. See id.; see also Green v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 299 F. Supp.
1100, 1102 (E.D. Mo. 1969) (district court's holding).
259. See Green, 463 F.2d at 340-41.
260. See id. at 341.
261. Id. at 342 (citations omitted).
262. See id.
263. See id. at 343.
264 Id.
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It would be antithetical to the remedial purposes of the Act to inter-
relate these sections so as to construe the Act to mean that an appli-
cant's civil rights activities which fall outside § 2000e-3(a) may serve
as a basis for employment disqualification without consideration of
the separate standards called for by § 20OOe-2(a)(1).20
Judge Bright, writing for the court, then considered
McDonnell Douglas's position that "it ha[d] the right under Ti-
tle VII to make subjective hiring judgments which do not nec-
essarily rest upon the ability of the applicant to perform the
work required."266 The court first noted that "in cases pre-
senting questions of discriminatory hiring practices, employ-
ment decisions based on subjective, rather than objective, cri-
teria carry little weight in rebutting charges of
discrimination."267 The court further recognized:
Employers seldom admit racial discrimination. Its presence is often
cloaked in generalities or vague criteria which do not measure an ap-
plicant's qualifications in terms of job requirements. Consequently, a
black job applicant must usually rest his case of discrimination upon
proof that he possessed the requisite qualifications to fill the position
which was denied him.2a
The court then articulated its momentous and controver-
sial position, defining a prima facie case of race discrimination
and shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. Judge
Bright, in the original opinion, wrote:
When a black man demonstrates that he possesses the qualifica-
tions to fill a job opening and that he was denied the job, we think he
presents a prima facie case of racial discrimination and that the bur-
den passes to the employer to demonstrate a substantial relationship
between the reasons offered for denying employment and the re-
quirements of the job.269
Judge Bright concluded that since McDonnell Douglas had
not shown any evidence that Green's participation in the pro-
tests would hamper his ability to perform the job, it had not
265. Id.
266. Id. at 352. This citation is to the modified opinion. Subdivision V of
the original Eighth Circuit opinion was modified in response to the petition
for rehearing by McDonnell Douglas. The court denied the petition in light of
the modifications; see also infra note 274 and accompanying text (specifying
which judges voted for or against the rehearing).
267. Green, 463 F.2d at 352. The court stated further that "[iln enacting
Title VII, Congress has mandated the removal of racial barriers to employ-
ment. Judicial acceptance of subjectively based hiring decisions must be lim-
ited if Title VII is to be more than an illusory commitment to that end, for
subjective criteria may mask aspects of prohibited prejudice." Id.
268. Id. (citations omitted).
269. Id. at 344.
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shown that the reason given was not pretextual. The court
remanded to the district court to utilize the appropriate stan-
dard to determine if McDonnell Douglas had been motivated by
racial bias.270
Judge Donald Lay wrote a concurring opinion, joining in
the reversal and remand, but arguing that the company's use
of Green's participation in the "stall-in" and "lock-in" were in
fact pretextual bases for his rejection.2 1 Judge Johnsen, the
third panel member, dissented27 2 and wrote what Judge Bright
would later call "a blistering dissent."273 McDonnell Douglas
petitioned for a rehearing en banc. The Eighth Circuit denied
the rehearing in a split decision of 4-4 after Judge Bright
agreed to modify the portion of the opinion enunciating the
new standard. 274
The key part of the modified opinion stated:
When a black man demonstrates that he possesses the qualifica-
tions to fill a job opening and that he was denied the job which con-
tinues to remain open, we think he presents a prima facie case of ra-
cial discrimination. However, an applicant's past participation in
unlawful conduct directed at his prospective employer might indicate
the applicant's lack of a responsible attitude toward performing work
for that employer.
... Green should be given the opportunity to show that these rea-
sons offered by the Company were pretextual, or otherwise show the
presence of racially discriminatory hiring practices by McDonnell
which affected its decision s.27
Judge Bright further stated in the modified opinion that
McDonnell Douglas and Green would have the opportunity, on
remand, to present evidence about whether McDonnell's deci-
sion was racially motivated. 276
270. See id.
271. See id. at 345-46.
272. See id. at 346-52.
273. Chief Judge Donald P. Lay et al., Presentation of the Portrait of the
Honorable Donald R. Ross (Oct. 30, 1987), in 843 F.2d XCII, CXIV (8th Cir.
1988).
274 See Green, 463 F.2d at 352. Judges Mehaffy, Floyd R. Gibson, Ste-
phenson, and Matthes voted for the rehearing en banc, while Judges Lay,
Heaney, Bright, and Ross voted against it. See Letter from Judge M.C. Mat-
thes to Robert Tucker, Clerk of Court, Eighth Circuit of Appeals (June 19,
1972). Judge Ross, in considering the en banc petition, made suggestions
which Judge Bright incorporated to create the standard enunciated in the ul-
timate opinion. See Lay et al., supra note 273, at CXTV-CXV.
275. Green, 463 F.2d at 353.
276. See id.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari, affirming in part
the Eighth Circuit's decision and further defining the elements
of a prima facie case. The Court adopted the substance of the
Eighth Circuit's holding regarding the shifting of the burden of
proof. Justice Powell, writing for a unanimous Court, adopted
"almost precisely those standards" Judge Bright had written in
the Eighth Circuit opinion. 277 The Supreme Court stated:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden
under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial dis-
crimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a ra-
cial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which
the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifica-
tions, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of complainant's qualifications.
2
7
The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejec-
tion.279
The Supreme Court further recognized that the applicant
for employment then "must be given a full and fair opportunity
to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively
valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a ra-
cially discriminatory decision."280 The Supreme Court thus
remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration in
accordance with these standards.
The law governing employment discrimination has devel-
oped rapidly since the McDonnell Douglas opinion in 1973.281
Employment discrimination law will continue to evolve as both
state legislatures and Congress continue to amend and enact
new laws bearing on employment protections. Examples in-
clude the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),282
the Age Discrimination Act,283 the Americans with Disabilities
277. See Lay et al., supra note 273, at CXV.
278. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
279. See id.
280. Id. at 805.
28L See generally LINDEMANN & GRoSSMAN, supra note 241.
282. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994). Congress amended the ADEA in 1974 to
include federal employees within the scope of its protection, Pub. L. No. 93-
259, § 28(b)(2), 88 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 633(a)), and to
include states and political subdivisions within the definition of "employer,"
Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(2), 88 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
630(b)).
283. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1994) (prohibits age discrimination by recipi-
ents of federal financial assistance, but generally does not apply to employ-
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Act (ADA),284 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.285 Plaintiffs will
continue to pursue their rights to equal employment opportuni-
ties, calling on the courts to enforce and interpret the laws. As
these laws develop, they will protect and preserve the rights of
individuals to equal employment opportunities and keep them
free from invidious discrimination. Judge Bright, through his
frequent participation on panels hearing Title VII cases and
his authorship of cases such as Parham and McDonnell Doug-
las, has left an indelible mark on the evolution of a body of law
guaranteeing equal employment opportunity for all Americans.
The Observations of Maurice T. FitzMaurice286
The McDonnell Douglas decision illustrates that, on rare
occasions, hard cases make good law. By the time that Percy
Green's appeal came to the Eighth Circuit, Green had estab-
lished a reputation in St. Louis as a notorious civil rights dem-
onstrator. He had offended the mainstream citizens by par-
ticipating in many demonstrations and activities described in
the district court's opinion.287 From the district court to the
United States Supreme Court, the judges and justices agreed
that, during the stall-in, Green had engaged in illegal conduct
specifically directed at McDonnell Douglas. Green's guilty plea
to the charge of obstructing traffic during the stall-in left little
room to argue that his conduct had not been illegal.288
In short, given Green's acknowledged misconduct, the case
presented difficult facts; so difficult that, in adopting the
Eighth Circuit's revised opinion, the Justices of the Supreme
Court unanimously agreed that even under the newly articu-
lated burden of proof standard, Green should lose on remand
unless he could "demonstrate that [McDonnell's] assigned rea-
ment).
284. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113 (1994) (prohibits discrimination in public
and private employment, public accommodations, public services, transporta-
tion, and telecommunications).
285. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).
286. Maurice T. FitzMaurice served as a law clerk to Judge Bright in 1971-
72. He is a graduate of Notre Dame Law School and is now practicing in
Hartford, Connecticut.
287. See McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, 318 F. Supp. 846, 848 (E.D. Mo.
1970).
288. See id. at 849.
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son for refusing to re-employ was a pretext or discriminatory in
its application."28 9
Notwithstanding these difficult facts, Judge Bright recog-
nized that the Eighth Circuit's analysis of Title Virs require-
ments in McDonnell Douglas would have a profound impact on
future Title VII cases. As the revised opinion explains, Title
VII was intended to root out historical discrimination in em-
ployment against blacks. Title VII would not have its intended
effect if the courts sanctioned the use of subjective employment
decisions that denied employment to qualified black appli-
cants. Accordingly, these subjective employment decisions
must be subject to judicial examination. Judge Bright's for-
mulation of the new burden of proof standard in McDonnell
Douglas has provided the means for that judicial examination.
CONCLUSION
Over the course of his thirty years on the federal bench,
Judge Bright has helped to decide more than 5,000 cases. But
it is not his longevity alone that makes him an extraordinary
presence in our judiciary. To each of his many cases he has
brought his own unique blend of intellect, propriety, and jus-
tice. He has diligently sought freedom for the innocent. He
has respectfully advocated proportionality and fairness in
punishment for the guilty. He has influenced the direction of
modem evidence law and made the American workplace a
fairer and more welcoming place. For all these efforts, we owe
him a debt of thanks.
An even greater debt is owed, however, by those individu-
als whose lives he has touched: the clerks who have worked for
him; the attorneys and litigants who have appeared before
him; the colleagues who have sat beside him; and the students
who have learned from him. It is interesting to note the evi-
dent effect of his personality and humor on those who have
known him. The observations of the law clerks in this article,
in addition to helping us to understand the cases, radiate deep
warmth for the man. The tribute of the Chief Justice, a
thoughtful testament by a man who has carved out his place on
the opposite philosophical pole, is proof that differences in
opinion need not create personal enmity.
We believe that it is this last point that bears repeating.
In a time when bitterness and venom seem to be more promi-
289. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973).
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nent features of our society and profession than are truth, jus-
tice, and compassion, Judge Bright's life, as well as his career,
should give us reason to reflect on our own. When we do so, it
becomes clear why so many others hold the very Honorable
Judge Myron H. Bright in such high regard and esteem.
